THE VIRTUE OF MERCY IN
CRIMINAL SENTENCING
Eric L. Muller*
The relationship between mercy and justice has been a source
of trouble in many disciplines and for many centuries. Although
philosophers, jurists, and theologians have approached and described the problem in their own ways,' they have all wrestled with
the same basic question: if justice is a moral virtue, and mercy a
tempering of justice, then how can mercy also be a virtue? True
moral virtues, after all, are not optional to the virtuous person; they
are mandatory. This is the dilemma of mercy: How can a person
act virtuously by deviating from virtue?
We have entered an era in which this question looms especially large. Guideline regimes now govern criminal sentencing in
the federal system 2 and in many states as well.' These systems,
which arithmetically determine sentencing ranges by reference to
distinctive aspects of the crime, the victim, and the offender, place
the dilemma of mercy in sharp relief, if only by compelling
sentencers to confront the possibility of departing from the prescribed ranges in particular cases.' These guideline regimes are,
perhaps, a signal of the ascendancy of retribution as the dominant
force in our current sentencing enterprise.' With its Gilbert-and* Assistant United States Attorney, Newark, New Jersey; Adjunct Professor, Seton
Hall University School of Law; A.B., Brown University; J.D., Yale Law School. The
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1 See, e.g., Patricia Helen McCune, The Ideology of Mercy in English Literature
and Law 71-103 (1989) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Michigan).
2 See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b) (1988); see also UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMMISSION,
GumE.INEs MANUAL § 1BI.1 (Nov. 1991) [hereinafter U.S.S.G.].
s See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. ch. 244 (West 1992); WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 310 et
seq. (West Supp. 1991).
4 See, e.g., U.S.S.G. § 5K2.0.
5 Not too long ago, retributivism was a decidedly unpopular theory of punishment, eclipsed by utilitarian and rehabilitative models. See, e.g., K.G. Armstrong, The
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Sullivan urge to "let the punishment fit the crime,"6 retribution
spotlights the dilemma of mercy by insisting that criminals receive
no less than their just deserts.
One of the most representative, and certainly one of the most
emphatic, of today's generation of retributivists is the legal philosopher Jeffrie G. Murphy. Murphy has shown particular interest in
resolving the dilemma of mercy.7 Mercy does not fare well in Murphy's account. Indeed, at least in the domain of the criminal law, it
emerges as a redundancy at best, and a moral vice at worst. In its
most commonly understood form-a sentencer's deliberate reduction of a just sentence out of compassion for the defendant-it is
mere "sentimentality."8 Murphy scorns merciful sentencers, urging
them to "keep their sentimentality to themselves for use in their
private lives with their families and pets."9
Is this retributivist resolution of the dilemma of mercy correct?
Does mercy's status as a moral virtue begin and end with the deciRetributivistHits Back, in THE PHILOSOPHY OF PUNISHMENT 130, 138-39 (H.B. Acton ed.,
1969). Our current criminal justice system's willingness to embrace retribution anew
as a central force in sentencing stems in some significant measure from the judicial
response to the campaign to abolish the death penalty. See Furman v. Georgia, 408
U.S. 238, 308 (1972) (Stewart, J., concurring) ("The instinct for retribution is part of
the nature of man, and channeling that instinct in the administration of criminal
justice serves an important purpose in promoting the stability of a society governed by
law. When people begin to believe that organized society is unwilling or unable to
impose upon criminal offenders the punishment they 'deserve,' then there are sown
the seeds of anarchy-of self-help, vigilante justice, and lynch law"); Gregg v. Georgia,
428 U.S. 153, 183-85 (1976) (plurality opinion).
6 See W.S. GILBERT & ARTHUR SULLIVAN, THE MIKADO, in THE COMPLETE PLAYS OF
GILBERT AND SuLLiVAN 343, 352 (1938) ("My object all sublime/ I shall achieve in
time-/ To let the punishment fit the crime-/ The punishment fit the crime;/ And
make each prisoner pent/ Unwillingly represent/ A source of innocent merrimentl/
Of innocent merrimentl").
7 SeeJEFFRIE G. MuRP HY & JEAN HAMPTON, FORGIVENESS AND MERCY (1988).

In-

deed, Murphy is one of the few retributivists who pays even passing attention to
mercy. Much of the current retributivist literature focuses principally on technical
questions of whether retributivism counsels upper and lower limits on punishment,
and how such limits should be determined. See, e.g., Andrew von Hirsch, Proportionate
Punishments, in PRINCIPLED SENTENCING 195-200 (Andrew von Hirsch & Andrew Ashworth eds., 1992); Norval Morris, Desert as a Limiting Principle, in PRINCIPLED SENTENCING 201-06 (Andrew von Hirsch & Andrew Ashworth eds., 1992); Andrew von Hirsch,
Ordinaland CardinalDesert in PRINCIPLED SENTENCING 207-19 (Andrew von Hirsch &

Andrew Ashworth eds., 1992).
8 MURPHY & HAMPTON, supra note 7, at 174 (Murphy). Murphy and Hampton
constructed FORGVENESS AND MERCY as a sort of dialogue, with each writing alternate

chapters in a continuing development of such ideas as forgiveness, resentment, hatred, and retribution. Because the authorship of each chapter is so clearly indicated
in the book, all future citations to the book in this Article will parenthetically indicate
either Murphy or Hampton as the author of the cited passage.
9 Id.
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sion to forego swatting Fido for soiling the rug? I will argue in this
Article that mercy is a sentencing attitude with a valuable role in a
retributivist model of criminal sentencing-a role that current retributivist theory does not acknowledge. Current retributivist theory reaches the wrong conclusion about mercy in part, at least,
because it works from an unrealistic and incorrect impression of
the nature of the judge's task in determining appropriate
sentences in real criminal cases. Examining the real sentencing
decisions that judges must make, I will demonstrate that mercy is
not a redundancy or a vice, but a moral virtue.
The Article is divided into five sections. Taking Murphy as a
model retributivist thinker, I first set forth his definition of mercy
as the act of imposing a lesser sentence than permissible, and I
explain the place of the merciful act in a conventional retributive
theory of justice. The second section begins with a discussion of
the most significant weaknesses in Murphy's account of mercy, and
ends with the development of a new formulation of mercy as a
highly specific state of mind rather than as an action. In the third
section, I examine the role of this attitude in a judge's process of
determining criminal sentences. Then, working with this new understanding of mercy and its role in the real process of devising
appropriate criminal sentences, I devote the fourth section of the
Article to the question of mercy's place and moral status in a retributivist system.1 ° I conclude that mercy is neither a redundancy
of justice nor a moral vice, but rather a moral virtue whose crucial
function is to guarantee that a criminal sentence is an act of good
will rather than an act of malice. Finally, in the fifth and concluding section of the Article, I discuss the ramifications of this conclusion for retributive theory.
I.
A.

MERCY AccoRDING TO MURPHY

The Nature of Retributivism

Jeffrie Murphy makes no effort to conceal the moorings of his
theory of justice. They are in the ethics of the eighteenth century
German philosopher Immanuel Kant. Murphy, of course, is not
alone in taking inspiration from Kant's writings. Kant's work, a
highly developed statement of what we know as "natural rights" or
10 My concern here is to examine and defend mercy strictly within a retributivist
system. While mercy might also be defined and defended under a different theory of
punishment, such as a rehabilitative model, that is outside the scope of this Article.
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"liberal" philosophy, 1 has had an enormous impact on the development of the American legal and constitutional tradition. In the
domain of the philosophy of the criminal law, the Kantian approach is known as retributivism. 1 The retributivist's central claim
is that a person who is guilty of a crime ought to be punished, even
if punishing him"3 is not societally useful.' 4 As Murphy points out,
retributivism is best understood as an "ultimate and violent revolt"
against a utilitarian model of criminal justice.' 5 A brief discussion
of a utilitarian's approach to criminal punishment is therefore in
order.
A utilitarian model of punishment-indeed, a utilitarian
model of anything-has as its goal the greatest good for the greatest number of people. Utilitarianism is founded on the intuition
that a human being, because of his ability to experience pleasure
and pain, will seek to maximize his pleasure and minimize his pain.
Utilitarianism is, however, a normative philosophy, not merely a
descriptive one, so it defines an individual's desire to maximize
pleasure or happiness as a moral virtue. And what is a virtue for an
individual is also a virtue for society. Thus, a social practice is virtuous to a utilitarian if it tends to advance the general welfare of the
society, that is, if it tends to enhance happiness and diminish misery.'" This is true even if the society, in engaging in the practice,
subjects some individual or group of individuals to abusive treatment. So long as the practice increases the happiness, health,
wealth, or security of a majority of the society's citizens, it is a
virtue.
It should be fairly obvious that such a society would not be a
particularly pleasant place to run afoul of the law. The defendant
is, after all, but one person, and to the extent that society as a
whole is made better off by inflicting any manner of punishment
on him, society's benefit will prevail over his. The defendant can
seek no refuge in a claim that society is violating his individual
11

SeeJEFFuE

G. MuRPHY & JuLEs L. COLEMAN, THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 106 n.7

(1984).
G. MurPPy, RETRIBUTION, JUSTICE AND THERAPY 82-92 (1979).
13 I will use the masculine pronoun throughout this Article in all circumstances
where a pronoun refers to an individual of unspecified gender. I adopt the masculine
pronoun as a grammatical convenience and nothing more.
14 See MURPHY, supra note 12, at 77.
15 MURPHY & COLEMAN, supra note 11, at 80.
16 See, e.g., JEREMY BENNiAM, Or LAws IN GENERAL 289 (H.L.A. Hart ed., 1970)
("The art of legislation has two general objects or purposes in view: the one direct
and positive, to add to the happiness of the community; the other indirect and negative, to avoid doing anything by which that happiness may be diminished.").
12 SeeJErrlRE
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rights, because the society in which he lives does not recognize
such rights. Individual rights are limitations on society's ability to
subject individuals to various types of rough treatment. They do
nothing but constrain society's ability to achieve, through any one
person, the greatest good for the greatest number of people-a
thoroughly disutilitarian result. 17 Utilitarianism thus makes a clear
statement about the relationship of the individual to his society.
That statement is that society may-indeed, should-treat the individual in whatever manner is most likely to increase its welfare.
The individual is a means to society's ends."
It is to exactly this notion that retributivism is a protest. Kant's
philosophy of criminal justice holds that:
[P]unishment can never be used merely as a means to promote
some other good for the criminal himself or for civil society, but
instead it must in all cases be imposed on him only on the
ground that he has committed a crime; for a human being can
never be manipulated merely as a means to the purposes of
someone else ....

19

Kant here is expressing a very basic disagreement with the utilitarians
not just about the societal enterprise of running a criminal justice system, but about the moral significance of personhood. For the utilitarians, the attribute of personhood that enables individuals to make
moral choices is their sentience-their ability to feel pleasure and
pain. To the Kantian, however, sentience is a foolish choice of attributes on which to base a moral theory for human beings, since the
ability to feel pleasure and pain is by no means peculiar to humans.
Anyone who has ever accidentally stepped on the tail of the family dog
knows that this is so.
The Kantian argues that a moral theory for human beings must
base itself on some attribute that, unlike sentience, is truly unique to
human beings. That attribute, for the Kantian, is the capacity to rea17 The version of utilitarianism discussed here is strict utilitarianism. There is another variety as well, known as "rule utilitarianism." Unlike its stricter cousin, rule
utilitarianism does recognize something like individual rights, but only because it is
useful to do so. A rule utilitarian recognizes that strict utilitarianism can create significant anxiety among the members of a society, as they fear the constant threat of
being treated brutally in the name of societal good. The rule utilitarian sees this
anxiety as not useful, and therefore recognizes individual rights against brutal treatment in order to dissipate the anxiety. Thus, he recognizes rights not for their own
sake, or because of anything about the nature of the individual, but because it maximizes society's overall happiness to do so.
18 This is true for both the strict and the rule utilitarian.

19 IMMANUEL KANT, THE METAPHYSICAL ELEMENTS

Bobbs-Merrill 1965) (1797).

OFJUSTICE 331 (John Ladd trans.,
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son. 20 The Kantian maintains that
it is just our status as rational beings which essentially distinguishes us from the brutes and founds that which is morally sacred and inviolate about our human nature. This value Kant
calls autonomy-a kind of rational freedom which gives us dignity and makes us deserve a special kind of respect (captured in
which is fitting to our nature as personsthe value ofjustice)
21
i.e. ours by right.
Thus, in all circumstances, Kantianism seeks to protect the unique
status of humans as free and autonomous beings endowed with the
capacity to make rational choices. Individuals may never be treated as
means to society's ends; they must be treated as "ends in
themselves."

22

The goal of a Kantian system of moral choice is therefore not to
maximize the welfare of any person or group of people, but to respect
the intrinsic worth of individuals as rational beings. This, of course,
makes for an approach to criminal punishment that differs radically
from a utilitarian's. For the utilitarian, the primary goal of punishment is deterrence, both special (punishing a criminal in such a way
as to deter the criminal himself from future lawlessness) and general
(punishing a criminal in such a way as to deter others from engaging
in the same lawless behavior). Deterrence is at bottom a utilitarian
enterprise because its goal is to maximize the safety, security, and happiness of society though its treatment of individual criminals.2 3 A true
retributivist, by contrast, wants nothing to do with this approach. A
retributive system of punishment is concerned with enforcing respect
for the freedom and dignity that all individuals are owed, as a matter
24
of right, by virtue of their autonomous status as rational beings.
Whereas utilitarianism counsels a criminal punishment system cen20 Due to space constraints, this is a highly simplified statement of the basis of

Kantian ethics. Murphy and Coleman summarize Kant's concept of rationality as "the
ability to appreciate morally relevant differences and similarities in people, actions,

and states of affairs and to choose to act consistently on the basis of an appreciation of
those differences and similarities." MuRPHY & CoLEMAN, supra note 11, at 80. A good
source for greater detail on Kant's views is THOMAS E. HiLL, D1GNrrY AND PRAcMAL
REASON IN KAr's MORAL THEORY (1992).
21 MuRPhy, supra note 12, at 68.

22 See MuRPHy & CoLEMAN, supra note 11, at 83 (explaining Kant's instruction that
one should always act so as to "treat rational persons as ends in themselves and never
as means only").
23 See id. at 123-25.

24 See MuRPHY, supra note 12, at 68 (Kant's value of "autonomy" is "a kind of rational freedom which gives us dignity and makes us deserve a special kind of respect
(captured in the value of justice) which is fitting to our nature as persons-i.e., ours by
right).
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tered around deterrence, retributivism demands a system built
around the concepts of "rights, desert, merit, moral responsibility,
25
and justice."
Thus, a crucial difference between a utilitarian system of punishment and a retributive system is that they have markedly different reasons for punishing wrongdoers. Whereas a utilitarian system punishes
wrongdoers in order to effect some net gain in social welfare, a retributive system punishes wrongdoers because they deserve to be punished. 6 In what sense do wrongdoers deserve punishment? The
retributivist answers this question by reference to a notion of reciprocity or moral balance. 27 To the Kantian, all members of society, in
their capacity as autonomous, rational beings, stand in a relationship
of moral balance or equipoise. Some see this relationship as quasicontractual: each member of society assumes the burden of restraining himself from significantly interfering with things others hold
dear, such as life and bodily security. 8 On this view, a wrongdoer is a
"freerider," someone who unfairly throws off the burden of law-abidingness and takes advantage of others who continue to shoulder that
burden. Others see the Kantian relationship of moral balance as a
statement about comparative human worth: each member of society,
as an autonomous, rational being, has the same intrinsic and objective
value as each other member of society.' On this model, a wrongdoer
is a person who, by treating another person wrongly, makes a false
statement about his own worth relative to his victim's. He says that his
own worth is great enough, compared to his victim's, to permit him to
treat his victim roughly-that is, as a means to his own ends.
Both of these types of retributivists agree, however, that the central purpose of punishment is to return the parties and society to the
position of equipoise that existed before the wrongdoer committed
his wrongful act. It achieves this goal either by reimposing on the
criminal the burden that he unfairly cast off, or by correcting the
criminal's false statement about his value relative to his victim's. In
either case, punishment is harsh treatment that the wrongdoer deserves as a consequence of his actions and that society has a right to
See MURPHY & COLEMAN, supra note 11, at 126.
See id. at 126-27 ("the retributivist seeks, not primarily for the socially useful
punishment, but for the just punishment, the punishment that the criminal (given his
wrongdoing) deserves or merits, the punishment that the society has a right to inflict and
the criminal a right to demand").
27 See MURPHY & COLEMAN, supra note 11, at 130; MURPHY & HAMPTON, supra note
7, at 124-43 (Hampton).
28 See, e.g., HERBFRT MoRRs, ON GUILT AND INNOCENCE 126 (1976).
29 See, e.g., MURPHY & HAMPTON, supra note 7, at 124-25 (Hampton).
25

26
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visit upon him. It is not harsh treatment that is calculated simply to
increase society's future well-being.
A retributivist thus plainly differs from a utilitarian in his reasons
for punishing, but he also differs from a utilitarian in his reasons for
refraining from punishment. Punishment for the utilitarian is a device for maximizing the general welfare. Therefore, a strict utilitarian
will limit the punishment he imposes on a wrongdoer only when the
punishment ceases to have a welfare-maximizing effect; that is, when
the cost of an incremental addition of punishment is no longer outweighed by the benefit of a decrease in the likely future incidence of
crime. 0 For the strict utilitarian, the important link is between punishment and some set of future consequences like the crime rate.
There is no necessary connection between the amount of punishment
and the egregiousness of the criminal's behavior, so long as the punishment deters. Neither is there a connection between the amount of
punishment and the discomfort the punishment causes the criminal,
so long as the punishment deters.
For the retributivist, by contrast, the important link is between
punishment and the person who, because of his criminal behavior,
deserves to be punished. The retributivist recognizes that the criminal, like all other members of society, is an autonomous, rational
human being who is entitled to be treated with basic dignity. Just as it
was wrong for the criminal to treat his victim as a means to his own
ends rather than as an end in himself, it is wrong for society to treat
the criminal as a means to its own ends. The amount of punishment
that a retributivist imposes, therefore, must take account of the criminal's essential worth and dignity. This means that the retributivist
must refrain from punishment that is out of all measure with the gravity of the criminal's offense, as well as from punishment that, by its
cruel severity, degrades the criminal3 1 And he must refrain from
such punishment even if he would serve society's interests by punishing more harshly.
This last feature is a crucial aspect of retributive justice. For a
Kantian, the central idea of criminal punishment is the dignity and
autonomy-we might say the secular sanctity-of the human being
endowed with the capacity to reason. A richly retributive system of
justice recognizes that all people are "intrinsically, objectively and
30 A rule utilitarian would take a slightly different view of this. He would limit
punishment where the risk of grossly severe punishment creates a level of anxiety in
the general public that is itself disutilitarian.
31 See, e.g. , MuiRi-iv & CoLEMAN, supra note 11, at 147-48.
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equally valuable."3 2 In other words, true retributivism is, at its core, a
deeply egalitarian system of punishment."3 It is concerned not with
exalting one individual over another, but with protecting and enforcing the inherent equality of all individuals.5 4
Significantly, though, there are (at least) two autonomous and
equally valuable beings in every criminal episode: the victim and the
offender. Because there are two parties to the episode with competing
claims to equal inherent worth, a retributive sentence will always strive
to protect the equal worth of the offender, even as it vindicates the
worth of the victim. This prong of retributivism, the prong that protects the equal worth of the offender, is an often overlooked feature of
the Kantian system. And it is precisely because this feature is so often
overlooked that retribution is often confused with its baser relative,
revenge. A vengeful victim denies the Kantian principle of egalitarianism by pushing for the subjugation of his malefactor in order to
debase and devalue him."5 A retributive victim, on the other hand,
wants to see his own equal value reaffirmed, but not by demeaning the
intrinsic worth of the wrongdoer.3 6 Retribution is therefore not a lopsided urge for singleminded revenge, but a balanced urge for evenhanded justice.
B.

The Place of Mercy in Murphy's Retributive Theory ofJustice

In the battle between utilitarians and retributivists,Jeffrie Murphy places himself squarely in the latter camp. 7 This does not
mean that Murphy would deny any utilitarian purposes to the enterprise of punishing. Rather, he acknowledges that an inevitable
result of imposing punishments is that some people will be deterred by the prospect of incarceration. 3 This, however, is not the
feature of punishment that interests him. The feature of punishment that interests him is its retributive face-its meting out of
wrongdoers' just deserts. Thus, while Murphy's account of justice
32 MuRPHY & HAMPTON, supra note 7, at 124 (Hampton).

33 See Hugo Adam Bedau, The Eighth Amendment, Dignity, and the Death Penalty, in
THE CONsTrrrTION OF RIGHTs 145, 153 (Michael J. Meyer & William A. Parent eds.,

1992) (human "dignity or worth is a kind of value that all human beings have equally
and essentially. The deepest, least empirical, way in which to express the moral egalitarianism of persons is by reference to their inherent dignity").
34 True egalitarian retributivism can thus be seen as a specific application of the
equality-protecting role of the rule of law that has been compellingly elucidated by
Robert A. Burt. See, e.g., ROBERT A. BURT, THE CONsTrrTUnON IN CoL'aFUr (1992).
35 MuRiHv & HAMPTON, supra note 7, at 137-38 (Hampton).
36 Id. at 138 (Hampton).
37 See id. at 7 (Murphy).
38 MuRPHU & COLEmAN, supra note 11, at 130-31.
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may not be purely and exclusively retributive, it is nonetheless crudally retributive. That is, retributivism is what gives shape to and
defines Murphy's approach to criminal sentencing, even if it is not
the sole engine of his account.
Murphy demonstrates the primacy of retribution in his account of criminal punishment when he describes retribution as "an
absolute side-constraint on the pursuit of utilitarian deterrence."39
By this, he presumably means two things. First, because the idea of
proportionality between the seriousness of the offense and the
amount of punishment is central to retributivism, a sentencer must
be sure that a criminal sentence is sufficiently severe to give the
criminal what he deserves for throwing off the burden of acting
lawfully and for making a false statement about his worth relative
to the victim. Secondly, and quite relatedly, retributive concerns
remind the sentencer that he should not get so carried away with
the urge to protect society from future harm that he "buy[s] this
benefit by treating criminals more harshly than they deserve to be
treated."40
What, then, is a "just"criminal sentence for a retributivist like
Jeffrie Murphy? In other words, what should a sentencing judge be
striving for when he takes the bench to do his work? This is an
important question, since the notion of justice (as opposed to utility) is crucial to the retributivist. The answer that emerges from
Murphy's writings is that a just sentence will always be of sufficient
severity to express the respect for the criminal's victim that the victim is entitled to by virtue of his status as an autonomous, rational
being. In other words, it will be sufficiently harsh to correct the
criminal's false statement about his victim's meager worth relative
to his own. However, it will in no event be so harsh as to degrade
the criminal by treating him inconsistently with the dignity that is
his due.4 '
Now that we know what a 'just" sentence is for Murphy, we are
in a position to understand the nature and place of mercy in his
retributive system. Mercy is a downward deviation from a sentence
that is "just"in the way described above. Murphy's precise formula39 Id. at 131.
401&

41 Of course, Murphy concedes that no real sentencing system is animated by just
one set of values. Thus, he acknowledges that a criminal sentence will also have nonretributive effects, such as deterring the offender and others from throwing off the
burden of behaving lawfully. As a retributivist, however, these effects for Murphy are
largely incidental to the true purpose of the criminal sentence, which is to give an
offender nothing more or less than his just deserts.
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tion is as follows: "To be merciful is to treat a person less harshly

42
than, given certain rules, one has a right to treat that person."
Murphy illustrates his definition with a simple example: suppose,
he says, the rules of chivalry give one knight the right to kill another at a certain moment of combat. If the vanquished knight
begs the other to show him mercy, he is asking that the victor take
some action less severe than killing him-that is, a less severe action than that permitted by the system of rules called chivalry.4"
Three conditions must therefore be present in order for a sentencer to have the option of exercising mercy in Murphy's conventional retributivist account. There must be "some notion ofjust or
rightful authority, some notion of the supplicant's having fallen
afoul of certain public rules, and the consideration of a certain
external action."" Stated differently, there must be ajudge who is
fully authorized by society to impose criminal sentences, an admission or a finding of guilt of a particular crime, and a specific sentence that society has identified as the fitting punishment for that
crime. If these conditions obtain-that is, if the judge can say to
the criminal, "you stand under certain rules and . . .I have the
authority to treat you in a certain harsh way because of those
rules" 4 5 -then mercy is possible.
Unquestionably the most significant aspect of this formulation
of mercy is that it is a way of acting, not a way of thinking or feeling. For Murphy, a softening in the way a victim feels toward a criminal is forgiveness. A softening in the way a sentencer acts toward a
criminal is mercy. While mercy can certainly spring from a change
in feeling, this does not change the fact that mercy is, at bottom, an
action.4 6 As Murphy writes, "to be merciful to a person requires

& HAMPTON, supra note 7, at 20 (Murphy).
Id.
44 Id.
45 Id. at 21.
46 Murphy is certainly not alone in defining mercy as an action. This is a very
common view among those who have written about mercy, including those who have
taken a far more charitable view toward mercy than has Murphy. See Alwynne Smart,
Mercy, in THE PHILOSOPHY OF PUNISHMENT, supra note 5, at 218 ("When a man exercises mercy, what he does is acknowledge that an offence has been committed, decide
that a particular punishment would be appropriate or just, and then decide to exact a
punishment of lesser severity than the appropriate or just one."); MURPHY & HAMPTON, supra note 7, at 158 (Hampton) ("Whereas forgiveness is a change of heart towards a wrongdoer ....mercy is the suspension or mitigation of a punishment that
would otherwise be deserved as retribution, and which is granted out of pity and compassion for the wrongdoer."); P. Twambley, Mercy and Forgiveness, 36 ANALYSIS 84, 86
(1976) ("[O]ne man shows mercy to another when he waives his right over that person
and thus releases him from his obligation, cancels the debt.").
42 MURPHY
43
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not merely that one change how one feels about that person but
also a specific kind of action (or omission) -namely, treating that
person less harshly than, in the absence of the mercy, one would
have treated him."47
As clear as Murphy is in defining mercy as an action, he is
rather sketchy on what might motivate a sentencer to act mercifully. Indeed, his core formulation of mercy, "treat[ing] a person
less harshly than, given certain rules, one has a right to treat that
person,"48 makes no mention whatever of a reason for acting mercifully.49 At several points in Forgiveness and Mercy, Murphy hints at
possible motivations. For example, he suggests that mercy is
"grounded in love (charity) and compassion,"" ° that it follows from
a change in how a sentencer feels about the criminal, 51 and that it
may be related to the sentencer's perception of specific individuating aspects of the criminal or his offense.5 2 Still, the overriding
feature of Murphy's definition is that mercy is the way a sentencer
acts when he imposes a lesser punishment than the sentencing
rules authorize.
Working from this formulation of mercy and its place in a retributive system of justice, Murphy launches a blistering attack on
the morality of mercy. His aim is to demonstrate that there is no
case in which the exercise of mercy is a moral virtue. Of course,
Murphy does not, at any point in his attack, detail just what he
takes a moral virtue to be. And as Alasdair Maclntyre has convincingly demonstrated, the question of what a moral virtue is admits
of no simple, uncontroversial answer.53 Still, we know that Murphy
is a retributivist, and we know that a retributivist's primary concern
is that a criminal sentence accurately reflect a criminal's just
deserts. We can therefore assume that a moral virtue in a criminal
sentencing system is a practice which moves the sentencer along
toward the goal of determining a fully just sentence, and which the
sentencer is therefore obliged to apply.54
& HAMPTON, supra note 7, at 167 (Murphy).
(Murphy).
49 It is useful to compare Murphy's unadorned definition of mercy in Forgiveness
and Mercy with the formulation offered by his co-author, Jean Hampton: "mercy is the
suspension or mitigation of a punishment that would otherwise be deserved as retribution, and which is granted out of pity and compassion for the wrongdoer." Id. at
158 (Hampton).
50 Id. at 164 (Murphy).
51 Id. at 167 (Murphy).
52 Id. at 169-73 (Murphy).
53 See ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, AFrER VRTUE 169-73 (1981).
54 See id. at 178.
47 MuRPHY
48 Id. at 20
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To reach his conclusion about mercy's moral status, Murphy
reasons from a pair of hypothetical criminal cases.5 5 In both of the
cases, the defendants (D1 and D 2) have killed another person. D,
has killed his own beloved child in an automobile accident; D 2 has
killed a person he hated in cold blood. The generally accepted
paradigm of mercy, Murphy explains, is where a judge decides to
impose a lighter sentence on D1 than on D2. But, he protests, there
is no sense at all in talking about mercy here. A sentencer who
goes lighter on D, than on D 2 is simply taking account of significant and relevant moral differences between D1 and D 2. In other
words, the sentencer is recognizing that D1 , who has lived through
the horror of accidentally killing his own child, is less morally culpable than D2 , who has cruelly and selfishly violated one of society's
most fundamental proscriptions. This form of discrimination, he
asserts, is the function not of mercy, but of retributive justice:
Basic demands ofjustice are that like cases be treated alike, that
morally relevant differences between persons be noticed, and
that our treatment of those persons be affected by those differences. This demand for individuation-a tailoring of our retributive response to the individual natures of the persons with
whom we are dealing-is a part of what we mean by taking persons seriously as persons and is thus a basic demand ofjustice.5 6
To those who would define mercy as the act of imposing a lighter
sentence on a person less deserving of punishment, and who would
label that act a moral virtue, Murphy has a simple response. That, he
says, is not an independent moral virtue at all. It is merely a redundancy of one feature of the independent moral virtue that we call
justice.
Murphy then continues his attack. He imagines a judge who, after taking account of all of the individuating moral features of a
crime, persists in further mitigating a criminal's sentence in the name
of mercy. This judge, Murphy claims, is acting unjustly. For if the
judge has in fact perceived all of the relevant moral features of the
crime and the criminal, and adjusted the sentence accordingly, he has
arrived at the just sentence. By definition, any reduction of that just
sentence in the name of mercy would be unjust. Needless to say, it is a
moral vice to act unjustly. "Thus," he concludes, "mercy must be, not
a virtue, but a vice-a product of morally dangerous sentimentality."5 7
These, then, are the two faces of mercy for Murphy: it is either a repe55 See MuRPHY & HAMPTON, supra note
56 Id. at 171 (Murphy).
57

Id. at 167 (Murphy).

7, at 170 (Murphy).
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tition of one aspect of retributive justice, or an indefensible departure
from retributive justice. Mercy is at best a redundancy, and at worst a
vice. In moral terms, neither of these faces is particularly attractive.
II.
A.

A NEW AccouNT OF MERCY

Real Sentencing Choices

Attacking mercy as a moral vice is certainly a daring venture.
Mercy has, after all, been seen for centuries as one of the greatest
of virtues. It figures prominently in the Judaic tradition, where, for
example, rabbis taught such lessons as, "Do not judge your fellow
until you have stood in his place.""8 Mercy is certainly a paramount
virtue in the Christian faith: In his "golden rule," Christ instructed
that "you shall love your neighbor as your self;"59 and he extended
this obligation to loving one's enemies as well.6 From these principles, he taught: "Judge not, that you be not judged. For with the
judgment you pronounce you will be judged, and the measure you
give will be the measure you get."6" And mercy is routinely praised
as a virtue in countless works of literature. Consider Isabel's plea
to Angelo on her condemned brother's behalf in Shakespeare's
Measure for Measure:
No ceremony that to great ones 'longs,
Not the king's crown, nor the deputed sword,
The marshal's truncheon, nor the judge's robe,
Become them with
one half so good a grace
62
As mercy does.
Murphy's task of condemning mercy as a vice in a retributive system of
justice is therefore a daunting one. Does he succeed?
I will argue that he does not. Of course, he makes a seemingly
compelling case that mercy is either a redundancy of justice or a vice.
But he grounds his ostensibly successful argument in an account of
our sentencing system that is both practically and theoretically flawed.
The practical flaw in his account of the criminal sentencing system is
that it does not take into account the real deliberative efforts that
sentencers must undertake in selecting sentences. The theoretical
flaw is that his version of the sentencing process is not truly or fully
58 Mishna, Avot 2:5; see generally Louis E. Newman, The Quality of Mercy: On the Duty
to Forgive in theJudaic Tradition, 15 JouRNAL OF RELIGIOUs ETmcs 155 (1987).
59 Matthew 22:35-40; Mark 12:28-34; Romans 13:8-10.
60 Luke 6:27-36; Matthew 5:43-48.
61 Matthew 7:1-2; Luke 6:37-38.
62 WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, MEASURE FOR MEAsuRE act 2, sc. 2, lines 59-63 (Louis

Wright ed., Pocket Books 1974).
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retributivist. Moreover, he appears to succeed in his ethical trashing
of mercy only by taking the narrowest view of what we all understand
"mercy" to be.
Murphy sees the sentencer who is considering mercy as having
two choices. He can impose the "just"sentence, or he can impose a
sentence more lenient than the just one. Mercy, we will recall, is the
act of imposing a lesser sentence than the governing system of rules
permits. The sentence that a retributive "system of rules" permits is
nothing other than the one required by justice; that is, the proper
recompense for the wrongfulness of the criminal's conduct, tempered
by respect for the criminal's inherent human dignity. Thus, according to Murphy, a judge who must decide whether to act mercifully
arrives at the point of decision with a predetermined penalty that the
judge can confidently identify as the (not simply "a") just sentence.
This penalty might be determined for the sentencer by the legislature,
or the sentencer might have to determine it for himself. But he must
have a good idea in mind of what the just sentence is before he can
entertain the idea of acting mercifully.
At this point, we might fairly ask ourselves two simple questions:
Is Murphy describing something real? And is he describing a system
that a good Kantian would recognize as genuinely retributivist? Murphy has chosen to build his theory of mercy on an "either/or" sentencing scenario: either the judge imposes a harsher sentence (the
"just"one), or he imposes a more lenient sentence. This is simply not
an accurate model of the overwhelming majority of sentencing decisions that sentencers are called upon to make. In fact, with the exception of the decision of whether to impose capital punishment, where
the sentencer has but two options, life or death, virtually no sentencing decisions are "either/or" decisions at all. Rather, in most cases,
the sentencer's task is to choose a sentence from within a continuum
of authorized punishments. For example, the judge may have to
choose a term of incarceration that is less than a statutory maximum
term of years 63 or between a statutory minimum term of years and a
statutory maximum term of years,6 4 or he may have to choose a term
65 See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (1988) ("Whoever, in any matter within the jurisdiction of any department or agency of the United States, knowingly and willfully...
makes any false ... statements ...,shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or both.").
64 See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 2251(d) (1988) ("Any individual who violates this section
shall be fined not more than $100,000, or imprisoned not more than 10 years, or
both, but if such individual has a prior conviction under this section, such individual
shall be fined not more than $200,000, or imprisoned not less than five years nor
more than 15 years, or both.").
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of incarceration from within a range of sentences determined by a
system of sentencing guidelines.6" Similarly, ajudge may also have the
opportunity in a given case to choose among various types or circumstances of punishment, such as incarceration, probation, community
confinement in a "halfway house," fines, restitution, and community
service. 66
It is therefore unrealistic to build an account of mercy on a
model of sentencing that imagines judges simply to be selecting one
or another of two possible sentences. Moreover, it is especially unrealistic to assume that a sentencer considering mercy arrives at the point
of decision with a predetermined notion of what the "just"sentence is.
The whole idea of sentencing ranges, whether they be products of
statutory minima and maxima or of sentencing guidelines, is that society has determined all of the sentences within those ranges to be potentially "just" ones for a given crime. The sentencer's job is to
choose, from within the range of just sentences, a sentence that he
deems appropriate to the particular case before him. So long as the
judge imposes a sentence from within the predetermined range, that
sentence is presumptively 'Just."6 ' Thus, contrary to Murphy's view, a

sentencer's real task is not to make a stark choice between a "just"
sentence and a milder one, but to make a subtle selection of the sentence that seems most just from among a group of just possibilities.
Of course, Murphy might lodge a protest to this criticism of his
account. "True," he might respond, "my account is unrealistic in the
way described. But this is merely a descriptive deficiency in my acSee generally U.S.S.G. § 1B1.1.
See, e.g., U.S.S.G. §§ 5B1.1 (probation), 5C1.1 (incarceration and community
confinement), 5El.1 (restitution), 5E1.2 (fines). At times, sentencing regimes are
quite explicit in requiring judges to make choices from among a broad range of possible circumstances of confinement. For example, under the federal sentencing guidelines, a judge charged with the duty of sentencing a defendant, the top of whose
guideline range is six months, may choose among straight incarceration, probation,
halfway-house confinement, or a mix of these conditions. See U.S.S.G. § 5B1.1(a).
67 One very clear indication that society views such sentences as just is that most
jurisdictions permit virtually no appellate review of sentences selected from within
legislatively prescribed ranges. In most jurisdictions that do not employ sentencing
guidelines, but simply allow judges to select sentences between statutory minima and
maxima, appellate courts review those sentences only for the most egregious abuses of
discretion. See, e.g., United States v. Tucker, 404 U.S. 443, 447 (1972) (discussing appellate review of sentences prior to the advent of guideline sentencing) ("a sentence
imposed by a federal districtjudge, if within statutory limits, is generally not subject to
[appellate] review"). In the current federal system, where an elaborate system of sentencing guidelines produces fairly narrow sentencing ranges, there is no appellate
review whatsoever of a sentence selected from within the sentencing guideline range.
denied,
See United States v. Vega-Encarnacion, 914 F.2d 20, 25-26 (1st Cir. 1990), cert.
111 S.Ct. 1626 (1991); United States v. Porter, 909 F.2d 789, 794 (4th Cir. 1990).
65

66
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count, not a normative one. Surely we retributivists should desire a
sentencing system that does identify for sentencers with razor-sharp
precision the (not merely "a") sentence that captures the truly just
deserts for specific crimes. The whole point of retribution, after all, is
to see to it that the criminal gets his precise due-the punishment he
deserves, and should expect, as a consequence of his lawlessness. Sentencing ranges are therefore at odds with the essence of retribution.
The goal of a retributive system of punishment," he might conclude,
"is not to establish ranges of potentiallyjust punishments, but to devise
a finely calibrated code of actuallyjust punishments."
Such a response, however, would be based in a flawed retributivism. The ambition to abandon a sentencing regime that permits a
sentencer some appreciable measure of discretion in the selection of a
just sentence is at odds with the organizing principle of retributivism:
respect for the autonomy of the individual. Retributivism distinguishes itself from utilitarianism precisely in the way that it understands and treats the parties to a criminal episode. It insists, at all
costs, on taking them seriously, as distinct, autonomous, and precious
human beings. And retributivism owes this understanding and this
treatment to all of the parties to the criminal episode, including the
criminal
To be sure, this is a feature of Kantianism that our instincts might
push us to scorn. We might ask, "Has the criminal not forfeited his
right to such consideration by his abhorrent behavior? Has he not
placed himself in a rather weak position to expect anything of us, the
people he has wronged?" This forfeiture argument holds at least a
visceral appeal to us as actual or potential victims of crime. Yet the
argument is wrong. As a technical matter, of course, it is erroneous
because it simply proves too much: if a criminal has truly forfeited his
rights to certain standards of consideration and treatment, then what
manner of pain and suffering may we not inflict on him in the name
of retribution?6'
The forfeiture argument is also flawed in a more specific way.
Criminals unquestionably forfeit something when they commit their
crimes. But this is not to say that they forfeit eveything, that they are
not even worth any expenditure of mental energy. 69 At the very core
of the Kantian notions of human dignity and autonomy is the princiSee Bedau, supra note 33, at 165.
It is worth noting that our criminal justice system is founded on the principle
that certain fundamental rights are not forfeited even by the most vicious of criminals.
For example, every federal defendant is entitled to the protections afforded by the
Bill of Rights. Although he can waive those protections if he so chooses, he does not
forfeit them no matter how outrageous his crime. See id. at 172-73. We must there68
69
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pie of respect: no individual may be the subject of condescending,
mocking, insulting, patronizing, or demeaning consideration by another or by society.70 Thus, when we say that a criminal has forfeited
something, what we mean is that he has forfeited a claim against certain types of rough treatment and handling by society-the drastic
curtailment of his physical liberty, his housing in less than optimal
quarters, and so on. If we are to be true to a commitment to Kantian
human dignity, though, we cannot mean that he has forfeited a claim
to a certain type of consideration by society, a system of deliberation
and regard based on respect. Respectful consideration is simply not
subject to forfeiture.
Retributivism therefore demands a sentencing method that
obliges sentencers to treat criminals as the unique individuals that
they are. This demand necessarily goes unmet in a rigid sentencing
regime that drives out discretion in favor of a blind and faceless uniformity. A true retributivist, committed fundamentally to respecting
the autonomy of all human beings, cannot say to a defendant in good
faith, "I will take you seriously as a human being, but I will only do so
by reference to the category you occupy on a predetermined schedule.""' This might be an acceptable way of typing butterflies, but it is
not acceptable to a retributivist as a way of sentencing human beings.
The autonomy of the defendant, in his capacity as a unique human
being, demands discretion in a sentencing regime.72 It demands an
fore recognize that the argument that a criminal forfeits everything cuts against the
grain of the system of justice contemplated by the Founders in our organic law.
70 See id. at 154-55; see also Alan Gerwith, Human Dignity as the Basis of Rights, in THE
CONsTrrTiON OF RIGHTS,

supra note 33, at 15 ("to treat someone with dignity is to

accord her certain kinds of consideration"); William A. Parent, Constitutional Values
and Human Dignity, in THE CONsTITUTION OF RIGHTS, supra note 33, at 60 ("It is...
insult and.., disrespect which ... define the assault on dignity"); Bernard R. Boxill,
Dignity, Slavery, and the Thirteenth Amendmen in THE CONsTrrruON OF RIGHTS, supra
note 33, at 103 ("Why is mockery so apt an attack on dignity? One plausible explanation is that the one claiming dignity makes certain assumptions, usually tacitly, which
if true demand that one be respected and taken seriously, and mockery not only denies these assumptions but presents them as foolish, vain, and absurd.").
71 See Parent, supranote 70, at 61 (human dignity is offended by the inclination "to
reduce human beings to certain simple and fixed kinds"); see also Samuel H. Pillsbury,
EmotionalJustice: Moralizing the Passions of Criminal Punishment, 74 CORtELL L. REv.
655, 663-64 (1989).
72 The regime of sentencing guidelines that currently governs criminal sentencing
in the federal system occupies an uncomfortable middle ground between a truly discretionary system on the one hand and a rigid system of precisely predetermined
mandatory penalties on the other. Whether that regime has struck an appropriate
balance between competing demands for discretion and uniform treatment is a subject of hot debate. See generally Daniel J. Freed, Federal Sentencing in the Wake of the
Guidelines: UnacceptableLimits on the Discretion of Sentencers, 101YALE L.YJ. 1681 (1992).
It is not the purpose of this Article to stake out a position in that debate. It is rather
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approach to sentencing that, in allowing judges to select sentences
freely from within ranges, differs markedly from the unrealistic and
theoretically flawed system that Murphy describes.
Thus, Murphy's account is plagued by both practical and theoretical weaknesses. Yet it is also plagued by a remarkable failure of ambition. By focussing so narrowly on mercy as an event, a discrete
sentencing action that a judge can take, Murphy fails even to try to
capture an entire area of mercy's meaning-not the idea of an individual act of mercy, but the broader notion of being a "merciful" sentencer. When we describe ajudge as "merciful," we describe far more
than a particular act or set of acts. By that adjective we comment on
the judge's bearing, on the spirit that infuses the judge's deliberative
attitude toward those who come before him for sentencing. That is,
we say something about the judge's character.
The study of moral virtue is rightly concerned more with traits of
character as expressed through actions than it is with actions standing
alone. If we want to draw conclusions about the moral status of
mercy, then, we must generate a definition of mercy that applies not
just to acts but to the character that fosters them. This is a project that
Murphy simply does not undertake. He scorns the act of mercy while
ignoring what it means to be merciful.
In light of these failings of description, theory, and ambition,
Murphy's apparent success in trashing mercy conceals some serious
and deep difficulties. If Murphy, as a retributivist, is to establish that
mercy is a moral vice, he must shoulder a far heavier burden than the
one he has chosen for himself. He must demonstrate that mercy plays
no role in a judge's deliberative approach to the task of selecting an
appropriate sentence from within a range of authorized punishments.
This, I will argue, is a task Murphy cannot meet. For mercy has a
crucial role to play in these real-world sentencing judgments.
B.

Mercy and Real Sentencing Choices

Two steps must precede the ultimate assessment of the moral
status of mercy in the criminal sentencing process. First, in order
the Article's purpose to show that a version of mercy is possible, to some extent at
least, in any retributive system that affords a sentencer a reasonable compass of discretion. It is, of course, possible that the mechanics of a sentencing process might so
mechanically dissolve an offender into a faceless and inhuman amalgam of sentencing "features" that merciful sentencing is impossible. That is, it may be that a
merciful state of mind can thrive only in a particular type of environment that a
highly rigid guideline system cannot help but destroy. The texture of a merciful attitude, and its compatibility with various models of guideline or mandatory sentencing,
are fascinating subjects, but beyond the scope of this Article.
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to know whether mercy is a moral virtue or a moral vice, we must
have a good sense of what we mean by "mercy." Second, after we
know what mercy is, we must also know what its function is in our
system of criminal sentencing. This section of the Article will be
concerned with the first of these two steps. It will develop a theory
of mercy progressively, first by identifying something that mercy is
not, and then by progressively narrowing an account of what mercy
really is.
1.

Mercy Is Not an Action.

What is mercy?. We already know Murphy's response to this
question: it is an action. I want to suggest that this is a fundamental flaw in Murphy's definition of mercy. Several examples will
show that it is at best fruitless, and at worst quite dangerous, to see
mercy as an action. Mercy is not an action at all; rather, it is an
attitude that influences and guides the action that the sentencer
ultimately takes.
Perhaps the most frequently quoted literary passage about
mercy is Portia's speech to the two disputing parties, Shylock the
Jew and the Venetian merchant Antonio, in Shakespeare's The
Merchant of Venice.
The quality of mercy is not strained,
It droppeth as the gentle rain from heaven
Upon the place beneath. It is twice blest:
It blesseth him that gives and him that takes.
'Tis mightiest in the mightiest, it becomes
The throned monarch better than his crown.
His sceptre shows the force of temporal power,
The attribute to awe and majesty,
Wherein doth sit the dread and fear of kings;
But mercy is above this scept'red sway;
It is enthroned in the hearts of kings,
It is an attribute to God himself,
And earthly power doth then7 show likest God's
When mercy seasons justice. 1
Portia delivers her stirring encomium to mercy as she stands disguised as a judge. Antonio, in order to finance his friend Bassanio's
voyage to woo Portia herself, has borrowed a large sum of money from
Shylock. Shylock, often cursed by Antonio in the past for charging
interest on loans, and just as often spat upon as ajew and called "mis73 WIUIAM SHAKEsPEARE, THE MERCHANT OF VENICE act

(Kenneth Myrick ed., Signet Classic 1965).

4,

sc.

1, lines 184-97
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believer, cutthroat dog,"7 4 agrees to loan Antonio the sum he requests, and without interest. There is a condition, however: if
Antonio cannot repay the loan when it comes due, Shylock may cut
away a pound of Antonio's flesh. Bassanio's voyage to woo Portia is
successful and they are betrothed, but Antonio suffers severe financial
reversals. When the time comes for him to repay the loan to Shylock,
he cannot do so. Shylock insists on his pound of flesh, and Antonio
must stand trial.
This is where Portia enters, disguised as ajudge, to adjudicate the
dispute between Antonio and Shylock. In her famous speech, she
urges Shylock to show Antonio mercy, but Shylock will not budge.
Portia initially suggests that she will rule for Shylock, announcing that
"[t]heJew shall have alljustice."7 5 Yet she begins imposing conditions
on Shylock's contractual remedy that make it impossible to obtain: he
has bargained for a pound of flesh, and so he may take flesh but not a
drop of blood, and he must take exactly a pound-not an ounce more
or less. As Shylock begins to relent from his demand, and ask only for
the return of his principal, Portia announces that his agreement with
Antonio was, in effect, the attempted murder of a Venetian citizen by
an "alien"-an offense punishable by death under Venetian law. The
Duke of Venice, however, who is in attendance at the trial, instantly
announces that he will show mercy to Shylock, and spare him his life.
But instead of taking Shylock's life, he takes all of Shylock's worldly
goods, forfeiting half of his fortune to Antonio, and the other half to
the state.
What does this well-known scenario tell us about mercy? Portia's
moving speech, of course, tells us something important about mercy's
texture and its grandeur. In the larger context of the entire play, however, Portia's resolution of the dispute between Shylock and Antonio
tells us something far deeper and more complex about the nature of
mercy, and indeed about the nature of moral virtue, than her words
alone suggest.
Throughout The Merchant of Venice, Shakespeare repeatedly invokes images that reveal the gulf that separates a thing's outward appearance from its true inner nature, and the ability of dramatically
opposed qualities to manifest themselves in the same outer form. The
play opens with an extended reference to Janus, a Roman god traditionally represented with two faces looking in opposite directions.
Antonio, overtaken by an inexplicable sadness, ponders the cause of
74 Id. at act 1, sc. 3, line 108.
75

Id. at act 4, sc. 1, line 321.
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his somber mood. A friend implores him to see that happiness and
sadness are interchangeable:
Then let us say you are sad
Because you are not merry; and 'twere as easy
For you to laugh and leap, and say you are merry
Because you are not sad. Now by two-headed Janus,
Nature hath framed strange fellows in her time:
Some that will evermore peep through their eyes
And laugh like parrots at a bagpiper;
And other of such vinegar aspect
That they'll not show their teeth in way of smile
76
Though Nestor swear the jest be laughable.
Outward appearances, like the faces on "two-headed Janus," are deceiving. They do not tell us which face represents the true emotions
lurking within.
Bassanio, too, elaborates on this theme when he is called upon to
choose among three caskets-two beautiful and one ugly-in order to
win the hand of the comely Portia. "So may the outward shows be
least themselves," he says, "The world is still deceived with ornament."77 He continues:

There is no vice so simple but assumes
Some mark of virtue on his outward parts.
How many cowards, whose hearts are all as false
As stairs of sand, wear yet upon their chins
The beards of Hercules and frowning Mars,
Who inward searched, have livers white as milk
And these assume but valor's excrement
To render them redoubted.78
These sophisticated lessons about the moral indecipherability of
appearances and actions are the deeper views that Shakespeare seeks
to convey in his play.
With this theme of the moral inscrutability of appearances in
mind, let us now return to Portia's resolution of the Shylock-Antonio
conflict, specifically, the final phase of the trial where Portia has
turned the tables on Shylock and announced that he has committed a
capital crime. When the Duke, speaking on behalf of all Christians,
announces to Shylock that "[t]hou shalt see the difference of our
spirit,/I pardon thee thy life before thou ask it," is he truly showing
Shylock mercy? Jeffrie Murphy, if he were to apply his definition of
mercy as the act of reducing a sentence below what the governing
76 Id. at act 1, sc. 1, lines 47-56.
77 Id. at act 3, sc. 2, lines 73-74.
78

Id. at act 3, sc. 2, lines 81-88.
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system of rules allows, would have to say that the Duke is indeed being
merciful. The Duke does, after all, forego a harsh punishment that
the law entitles him to exact, opting instead simply to rob Shylock of
his wealth. But do we really think that true mercy toward a Jew is
possible when it is being dispensed by and on behalf of an angry, antiSemitic mob? Might this just be a simulacrum of mercy, concealing a
deeper and darker purpose?
Let us now look at the character of Portia, and imagine that she
had been the judge in a criminal action against Antonio, rather than a
breach-of-contract action. Let us further imagine that the cutting
away of a pound of flesh was not a contractual remedy devised by
agreement of Antonio and Shylock, but a criminal penalty authorized
by the laws of Venice for Antonio's conduct. Had Portia followed her
moving speech about "the quality of mercy" by announcing that she
would not exact a pound of Antonio's flesh, but would instead require
Antonio to work until he had enough money to repay Shylock with
interest, would this have been an example of mercy? She would
certainly have acted to reduce the punishment she was entitled to
inflict, thereby qualifying her act as an act of mercy under Murphy's
definition.
Nonetheless, I think we would all hesitate to call her sentencing
decision merciful, because we would know that her reasons for acting
leniently were thoroughly impure. She is in love with the best friend
of the man she is sentencing-a man who, by the very transaction that
she is judging, enabled her beloved to seek her hand. She also plainly
shares the racial contempt for the victim, Shylock, that all of her
fellow Venetians seem to feel. This certainly makes Portia's soaring
rhetoric about mercy more than a little suspect.
Indeed, knowing what we know about the real identity of the
disguised judge in Antonio's case, and her motives for imploring
Shylock to reflect on "the quality of mercy," we are able to answer a
rhetorical question that Bassanio poses earlier in the play.
Contemplating the choice that he must make among the three caskets
in order to win Portia's hand, Bassanio is moved to comment on how
outward beauty sometimes conceals inner ugliness. He asks aloud:
In law, what plea so tainted and corrupt
But being seasoned with a gracious voice,
79
Obscures the show of evil?

As Portia will later reveal in her eloquent yet deceitful plea for Shylock's leniency, the answer to Bassanio's rhetorical question is mercy.
79

Id. at act 3, sc. 2, lines 75-78.
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Shakespeare is thus telling us something very important about
the nature of mercy in The Merchant of Venice, but his message is considerably more complex than that "the quality of mercy is not
strain'd." He is telling us that we can really learn nothing at all about
mercy from its outward manifestation, which is the simple action of
reducing a sentence. The only way we can know whether an action is
truly merciful is to ignore its appearance, and identify the reasons and
emotions that motivate it.
We can also test Murphy's theory that mercy is an action by a
hypothetical scenario that is based not in literature, but in the law.
Let us imagine a sentencing judge, Judge Smith, who, over the course
of a lengthy career on the bench, has the opportunity to sentence a
large number of defendants for the crime of breaking and entering.8 0
Breaking and entering has a range of legislatively authorized punishments of two to five years. The average sentence imposed by all
judges for the crime of breaking and entering in his district is four
years. Judge Smith's average sentence for the white defendants who
have come before him is three years. His average sentence for the
black defendants who have come before him is three and one-half
years.
From these statistics, can we say that Judge Smith showed mercy
to the white defendants? According to Jeffrie Murphy's formulation
of mercy as an action, the answer to this question is "yes": the system
of rules authorized a sentence of five (or, taking the other judges in
the district as a measure of what is just, four) years, and Judge Smith
imposed sentences that were more lenient than that by a full two years
(or one year). But how can we really conclude that the judge has
been merciful? That is, looking at what Judge Smith did, how can we
know whether he viewed three and one-half years as the "just"punishment for the crime of breaking and entering, and went easy on the
white defendants, or viewed three years as the 'just" sentence for the
crime, and was harsh to the blacks? If we view mercy as an action,
there is no way for us to know. Yet a rich account of mercy ought to
be able to help us answer this question.
We might also ask another, perhaps more interesting question
about Judge Smith. Has he been merciful to the black defendants? If
mercy is the act of imposing a lesser sentence than a system of rules
permits, then Judge Smith has surely done this as to both the white
and the black defendants. As to the blacks, he has imposed sentences
80 For the sake of simplicity, let us further assume that all of the defendants who
have come before Judge Smith for breaking and entering have committed the crime
in essentially the same way, and have been otherwise similarly situated.
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one and one-half years shorter than the legislature authorized, and six
months shorter than the presumably just sentence imposed by his colleagues for the crime of breaking and entering. Yet because we know
of the difference between his average sentences for whites and blacks,
we balk at the idea of calling his sentences of black defendants
merciful. We balk because we suspect something malevolent about
the spirit with which Judge Smith is imposing sentences on black defendants. This malevolence prevents the judge's sentences from being truly merciful, no matter what action the judge takes.
This hypothetical about Judge Smith confirms Shakespeare's
teaching about the uselessness of viewing mercy as an action. Where a
sentencer's role is to pick sentences out of ranges of permissible punishments, it is useless to view mercy as an act. Indeed, it might be
worse than useless: it might even be dangerous, for acts can conceal
their own motivations. Defining mercy as an action, rather than as a
frame of mind that helps produce an action, might blind us to darker
purposes that seek to masquerade as mercy.
A final example that demonstrates the danger of defining mercy
as an action is to be found in euthanasia-a practice we tellingly refer
to as "mercy" killing. Let us imagine two married couples. Both husbands are suffering from an extremely painful variety of cancer for
which there is no known therapy, and which is always terminal. Each
of the husbands tells his wife that he has a pistol hidden in his desk,
and asks her to shoot him and put an end to his misery. One of the
wives, moved by the horrible pain and indignity that her husband has
been suffering, and convinced that her husband will be better off with
the suffering at an end, takes the pistol and shoots him. The other of
the two wives, angry over a long string of affairs that her husband had
had in his healthier days, and eager to enjoy his estate, takes the pistol
and shoots him.
To the outside world, both of these incidents would appear to be
acts of mercy killing. Yet our instincts tell us that only the former case
presents a true act of mercy; the latter seems to be an act of murder.8 1
Again, the only way we can detect a moral difference between these
two cases is to place to one side the action that the wife actually took,
and examine the mental attitude that engendered the wife's action in
the first place. If we focus on mercy as an action, we lose the ability to
detect darker, meaner impulses that might masquerade as mercy.
81 I do not mean to enter into a debate here about whether it is morally justifiable
to kill another person to end that person's misery. Instead, I ask the reader to assume, for the sake of argument, that mercy killing is morally defensible when done
for the right reasons.
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From all of these examples, we can conclude that mercy is not, as
Murphy suggests, simply the act of imposing a lesser sentence than a
particular system of rules allows. Neither is mercy a quality that can
even be effectively gauged by reference to action. Mercy is rather an
attitude that guides or influences action in particular cases. Happily,
this conclusion is consistent with a fairly basic instinct that we have
about moral virtues: they are things that we do, to be sure, but they
are not virtues simply because we do them. Rather, they are virtues
because we make a deliberate decision to practice them as virtues. In other
words, actions or practices are virtuous not simply because we engage
in them, but because we engage in them as a consequence of a careful
form ofjudgment. As Alasdair MacIntyre notes, "what it is to fall into
a vice cannot be adequately specified independently of circumstances:
the very same action which would in one situation be [the virtue of]
liberality could in another be [the vice of] prodigality and in a third
[the vice of] meanness.""2 For this reason, MacIntyre concludes that
"judgment has an indispensable role in the life of the virtuous man
which it does not and could not have in, for example, the life of the
merely law-abiding or rule-abiding man."8" In MacIntyre's terms,
mercy cannot be understood by reference simply to a sentencer's action. It can be understood only by reference to the process of judgment that produces that action.
2.

Mercy is not mere leniency.

The above examples suggested that mercy is not an action, but
a deliberative attitude. This is a start toward a definition of mercy,
but only a start. What sort of an attitude is mercy? How does a
sentencer inclined to mercy achieve this particular frame of mind?
Let us begin to answer this question with another example. A
federal judge, newly appointed to the bench, announces that he
will be granting every criminal defendant who comes before him a
twenty percent downward departure from the bottom of the defendant's sentencing guideline range. Is this judge showing mercy
to the defendants he sentences?
Murphy's raw definition of mercy would, of course, have to
describe the judge as merciful, since the judge would be imposing
lesser punishments than the governing system of rules allows. But
our instincts tell us that this is not so. We suspect that the judge's
policy is not one of true mercy precisely because it is a poliy-a uniform sentencing decision that the judge makes in each case, re82 MAcINrmrE, supra note 53, at 144.
83 Id.
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gardless of the circumstances. The most hardened career criminal
who commits his crime with the cruellest and most hateful of motives receives the same dispensation as the hapless dupe who is cajoled into his first offense by an overbearing associate. And even
though the offer of a flat twenty-percent discount from the bottom
of the guideline range for all defendants may seem very generous,
there will surely be defendants with strong claims for mitigation to
whom the offer seems downright paltry.
Let us suppose, then, that our federal judge is stung by this
criticism, and that he attempts to respond to it by announcing a
change in his policy. He will award to each defendant who comes
before him a downward departure of at least twenty percent from
the bottom of the sentencing guideline range. How much of a departure beyond twenty percent a particular defendant receives will
be a function of the distinguishing circumstances of his case.
Has the judge successfully responded to the criticism and established a truly merciful system of sentencing? He has, to be sure,
remedied the most salient flaw in his prior system. Now, under the
new regime, he will be able to take account of the individual circumstances of each case, crafting greater downward departures for
the less culpable defendants and lesser ones for the more culpable.
It would seem, then, that if the judge's goal was true mercy, he has
met his mark.
Striving for mercy, this judge has found only leniency. Leniency in a sentencing judge is a propensity to a particular kind of
action. It is, in a sense, an attitudinal preference for what Murphy
incorrectly defines as mercy-the bare act of imposing a lesser sentence than that counseled by the prevailing system of rules. While
leniency has the capacity to recognize distinguishing aspects of particular cases, it does so only in a thoroughly impoverished sense.
For although our lenient federal judge can award an eighty percent downward departure to a relative innocent and a mere twenty
percent discount to a comparative brute, he cannot refuse a departure entirely to a defendant who does not deserve one at all. To
refuse a departure entirely would be a violation of an attitude the
judge himself holds dear-soft treatment for all those convicted of
crime. Lenient sentences therefore cannot ever be pure distillations of the circumstances of the offense, the offender, and the
victim, because they must in all cases pass through a filter which is
the judge's own rule-driven insistence upon a particular type of action. A lenient judge's sentences are therefore more of an expression of the judge's own principles and personality than they are a
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description of, and response to, the criminal episode itself. They
are, at bottom, rule-driven action.
Mercy, on the other hand, is not an attitudinal preference for
a particular kind of action. Instead, it is a predisposition to incorporate a specific view of, and attitude toward, the defendant into
the process of devising an appropriate sentence. It is a predisposition to allow actions to be informed by certain types of thoughts
and feelings. Mercy therefore does not singlehandedly foreclose
almost any sentencing action as a matter of principle. 4 Virtually
any sentencing action is theoretically possible, so long as it is a
product of a decision-making process that incorporates a defendant-based frame of mind.
This frame of mind is one that insists on taking account of
individual aspects of particular cases. It cannot arise in the abstract, and it cannot express itself as a blanket policy. It is, in other
words, crucially dependent on context. Thus, whereas leniency is
ultimately a context-free, rule-driven way of acting, mercy is a context-sensitive way of thinking that defies close regulation by rules.
Mercy is quite definitely not mere leniency; it is considerably more
complex.
3.

Mercy springs from consideration of issues pertinent to
punishment.

Let us then continue to unpack the meaning of the complex
attribute of mercy. In section 2 above, I demonstrated that mercy
is a deliberative attitude induced by the sentencer's focussing on
distinguishing aspects of the case before him. But surely it is possible to hammer out a more precise definition than this. What exactly are the aspects of a criminal case that a merciful sentencer
examines?
Let us imagine a judge who is called upon to sentence a prominent local businessman convicted of fraud. The judge takes the
bench and discloses that his initial plan was to impose a five-year
sentence-the statutory maximum term of incarceration-on the
businessman. However, the judge explains, he was unaware at the
outset that the defendant was represented by a highly respected
member of the bar who was a law school classmate of the judge's.
Thus, he concludes, because the businessman is represented by
84 The only punishments that the virtue of mercy categorically forecloses are those
that irrevocably rupture the relationship between the criminal and society by entirely
silencing the criminal's voice. The death penalty is such a punishment. See infra note
125.
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highly esteemed counsel, he will impose a sentence of only four
years' incarceration.
Murphy's raw definition of mercy as the act of imposing a
lesser sentence than permitted would label the judge's action
merciful, but we know that it is not. The reduction in sentence is
not an act of mercy because the judge arrives at his decision to
reduce the businessman's sentence by focussing on an aspect of
the particular case before him that has nothing to do with punishment. Returning for a moment to Shakespeare, we might think of
his play Measurefor Measure, where Claudio insists that he will commute Angelo's death sentence only if Angelo's sister Isabel agrees
to sleep with him."5 If Isabel had submitted to Claudio's corrupt
demand, and Claudio had then commuted Angelo's sentence, this
would have looked to the world like an act of mercy. Yet it would
not have been, because Claudio would have arrived at his decision
by focussing not on anything about Angelo or his crime, but on the
satisfaction of his desires for Angelo's sister. These examples suggest that mercy is a frame of mind that stems from the sentencer's
focussing not just on the particular case before him, but on those
aspects of the case that are pertinent to punishment.
4.

Mercy springs from consideration of non-utilitarian
aspects of punishment.

Yet this is still far too broad a definition of mercy, since every
criminal case might present a wide variety of issues that are pertinent to punishment. As I suggested above in Part I, a given case
might raise one set of concerns relevant to special deterrence, another set of issues relevant to general deterrence, and yet another
set of retributive questions. Not all of these features, however, have
an impact on the frame of mind that I am labelling mercy. In fact,
utilitarian concerns have no bearing whatsoever on a merciful
attitude.
A simple example will demonstrate that this is so. A defendant
is convicted of a narcotics distribution offense which has a statutory
sentencing range of between five and twenty years. The judge
takes the bench to sentence him and announces that he views the
proliferation of drug abuse as the most serious problem facing society. He says that he intends to impose a twenty-year term of incarceration on the defendant in order to send a message to the
defendant and his fellow drug dealers that society will deal with
85 WILLAM SHAKESPEARE, MEASURE FOR MEASURE, supranote 62, at act 2, sc. 4, lines

88-98.
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them harshly unless they renounce their illegal ways. Defense
counsel, prepared to respond to such an argument, produces a
wealth of social science research demonstrating that, for the types
of transactions that were the staple of the defendant's business,
sentences of longer than ten years have never produced a measurably greater deterrent effect than ten-year sentences. The judge reviews defense counsel's submissions and imposes a ten-year
sentence on the defendant.
This judge is not showing the defendant mercy, even though
he is imposing a lesser sentence than the sentencing scheme permits. As he deliberates on exactly where the sentence should sit
within the authorized range, the judge's focus is on the utility of
the sentence as a tool for promoting the welfare of society as a
whole. Thus, what prompts the judge's reduction in the sentence
has nothing to do with the defendant's culpability or with any circumstance about the defendant that mitigates it. The reduction
betokens no mercy, but an adjustment in the judge's assessment of
the sentence's usefulness in achieving a societal goal. We can
therefore continue to narrow our formulation of mercy: it is a
mental outlook that is induced by the sentencer's focussing on aspects of the case that are pertinent to non-utilitarian reasons for
punishing.
5.

Mercy requires a momentary abandonment of society's
and the victim's perspectives on the crime.

Our society imposes criminal sanctions for a mix of utilitarian,
rehabilitative, and retributive reasons.8 6 We just saw, however, that
the values that animate the sentencing attribute of mercy have
nothing to do with utilitarian reasons for punishing. Thus, we
might infer that mercy springs from consideration of retributive
concerns. This inference, however, may be too broad. The primary goal of a retributive system of punishment is to devise a criminal sentence that accurately describes the fundamental
wrongfulness of the defendant's conduct. The retributivist is there86 See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (1) & (2) (1988) ("The court shall impose a sentence
sufficient, but not greater than necessary, to comply with the purposes set forth in
paragraph (2) of this subsection. The court, in determining the particular sentence
to be imposed, shall consider-(1) the nature and circumstances of the offense and
the history and characteristics of the defendant; (2) the need for the sentence imposed-(A) to reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote respect for the law,
and to provide just punishment for the offense; (B) to afford adequate deterrence to
criminal conduct; (C) to protect the public from further crimes of the defendant; and
(D) to provide the defendant with needed educational or vocational training, medical
care, or other correctional treatment in the most effective manner;...").
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fore a type of investigator: his business is to develop as complete
an impression as possible of the wrongfulness of the criminal act.
Naturally, the first person that the retributivist investigator would
want to consult would be the victim of the defendant's crime. He
would also need to gauge the reactions of witnesses to the crime.
This, of course, would oblige him to probe the impressions of the
eyewitnesses to the crime itself, but it would also require him to
assess society's overall attitudes toward the defendant's criminal
behavior.
Mercy has no place in this investigation. Although mercy is
part of the retributive process, it does not spring from a sentencer's
consideration of either the victim's or society's perspective on the
wrongfulness of the crime. Two hypothetical cases will show that
this is so. First, let us imagine two investment advisers, IAI and IA2 ,
who independently concoct similar fraudulent investment
schemes. V1 invests $10,000 in IAl's investment scheme, and loses
all of his money in short order. V2 invests $10,000 in IA2's investment deal, and loses it all as well. V1 is an elderly man whose entire
life savings was the $10,000 he invested in IAl's scheme. V2 is a
huge institutional investor worth several hundred million dollars.
IA1 and IA2 are both convicted of fraud, and their cases come
before the same judge for sentencing. Because the complexity of
the two frauds and the amount of the losses occasioned by them
are essentially the same, IA 1 and IA2 have identical sentencing
ranges of six to twelve months' imprisonment.
At the sentencing hearings for IA1 and IA 2, the judge reads
letters from V, and V2 into the record. V, complains bitterly of
IAl's deception, explaining that the fraud has stripped him of his
life's savings and left him destitute. V2 expresses indignation at
IA2 's treachery, but explains that the $10,000 loss is not ruinous in
the context of all of its investments. Indeed, V2 adds, it views itself
as partly responsible for the loss by not monitoring its choice of
investments more carefully. V2 explains that the incident has had
the beneficial effect of triggering a wholesale reexamination and
updating of V2 's investment monitoring practices. After reading
these letters, the sentencing judge picks a sentence near the top of
the sentencing range for IA, and a sentence near the bottom of the
range for IA2.

IA2's sentence is less harsh than IA1 's, but this does not mean
that it is more "merciful." To be sure, the judge would have acted
within the bounds of his discretion if he had imposed the same
sentence on IA 2 as he imposed on IA1 . Yet, had he done so, he
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would have demonstrated only the roughest of understandings of
the difference between the wrongfulness of IA2 's crime and IA1's.
By taking the letters from V1 and V2 into account, and allowing
them to suggest a higher sentence for IA1 than for IA2 , the judge
comes closer to attaining the proper retributive goal of describing
as exactly as possible the harmfulness of the criminal activity. The
letters, in other words, constitute powerful evidence for the judge
that he might well be thinking unreasonably if he views IAI's and
IA2's crimes as equally wrongful. Thus, when the judge devises different sentences for IA, and IA2, he does so not because he wishes
to be merciful, but because he wants to make certain that his own
estimation of the wrongfulness of the crimes accurately captures
the victims' perspectives on that issue.
A second hypothetical case will show that mercy also excludes
consideration of society's estimation of the wrongfulness of criminal activity. Let us suppose that a young man is charged and convicted in 1959 of failing to register for the draft, and is granted
release on bail pending his sentence. On the eve of his sentencing
hearing, he vanishes. Fifteen years later, in 1974, he is apprehended on a bench warrant for his arrest stemming from his failure to appear for sentencing in 1959. The authorities successfully
press charges against him for bail jumping, but they also return
him to the judge who was to sentence him on the failure-to-register
conviction so that he may finally be sentenced for that crime. The
judge reviews the notes that he made in anticipation of the 1959
sentencing hearing, and sees that he had intended to impose a sixmonth term of imprisonment. At the sentencing hearing, he informs the defendant that, fifteen years earlier, he would have sent
him to jail for six months. However, he explains, the significance
of failing to register for the draft has changed during the fifteen
years since the defendant's conviction as the public's attitudes
about the Vietnam War have developed. The judge concludes by
saying that he does not feel it would be fair to send the defendant
to jail for six months for the crime of failing to register, and imposes a sentence of probation and one hundred hours of community service.
Again, the judge's act of lowering the defendant's sentence is
not an act of mercy. It is instead the product of the judge's effort
to make sure that his sentence accurately reflects society's estimation of the wrongfulness of the defendant's conduct. Were the
judge to impose the same six-month sentence on the defendant in
1974 that he devised in 1959, society might well take issue with that
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sentence, but society's complaint would not be that the judge
failed to show the defendant mercy. It would be that the judge
failed to speak with society's voice about the true harmfulness of
the defendant's wrongdoing. Thus, when the judge reduces the
defendant's sentence, that reduction might look like mercy when
viewed simply as an action. His reason for acting reveals, however,
that his true concern is to be as thorough and accurate a spokesman for society's current values as he can be. That is certainly a
proper concern for a retributivist, but it is not a concern for a retributivist who is seeking to be merciful. Continuing to develop
our formulation of mercy, we can conclude that mercy is an attitude that a sentencer adopts by focussing on the retributive aspects
of the case from a perspective that is not the victim's, and is also
not society's.
6.

Mercy springs from an effort to see the impact of the
sentence from the defendant's perspective.

Mercy's focus is slowly beginning to emerge. We know that a
merciful sentencing action stems from consideration of distinguishing aspects of particular cases. We also know that a merciful
frame of mind excludes consideration of how a sentence might be
useful to society, as well as how a sentence might best capture society's or the victim's estimation of the wrongfulness of the defendant's conduct. Mercy, then, is a frame of mind that seems to spring
from consideration of distinguishing concerns that are peculiarly
related to the defendant, as opposed to the victim or society. This
concept of "defendant-relatedness" is, however, still quite vague
and ill-defined. In what ways does mercy spring from concerns that
are related to the defendant?
A hypothetical case will again assist in answering the question.
Let us imagine an elderly stockbroker who is convicted of fraud.
The judge's statutory sentencing options for the defendant's crime
run from probation to five years' incarceration, along with fines of
up to $100,000. Before the sentencing hearing, the stockbroker
learns that he has a very deadly variety of cancer in a fairly advanced stage. His doctors tell him that he has between three and
six months to live. He informs the sentencing judge of his condition, and asks for a sentence of probation and a fine. He explains
that this is the only sentence that will allow him to put his affairs in
order before dying, to spend his little remaining time with his family, and to avoid the miserable prospect of dying in jail. The judge
responds that he views the defendant's crime as a serious one that
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merits incarceration; in fact, he discloses that he had planned,
before hearing of the stockbroker's condition, to impose a sixteenmonth sentence. However, he says, because of the defendant's
dire medical situation, he will decrease that sentence by half, but
no more. He imposes an eight-month term of incarceration on the
stockbroker.
In a world where mercy is the mere act of imposing a lesser
sentence than the prevailing system of rules allows, the judge's sentence is a merciful one. But how do things look from the stockbroker's perspective? He has not really received any kind of break at
all from the judge. In his eyes, an eight-month sentence is a life
sentence. He sees the judge's fifty percent reduction in his sentence not as an act of mercy, but as a cold-hearted mockery of
mercy.
The judge's sentence is a mockery of mercy because it does
not spring from a good-faith effort to see the impact of the sentence from the defendant's perspective. The stockbroker simply
has no reason to believe that the judge tried, even for a moment, to
step out of his role as an impartial arbiter and into the defendant's
own shoes. This example suggests an important feature of mercy:
it is an attribute of the sentencing process that involves the shifting
of perspectives. Specifically, we might say that mercy is a frame of
mind that springs from the sentencer's imaginative effort to see the
impact of the sentence on the defendant from the defendant's
perspective.
A brief return to the topic of euthanasia will corroborate this
insight. I earlier called attention to the significance of our language's colloquial expression for euthanasia. Ordinarily, we think
of killing another human being as the most harmful action one
could possibly inflict on another.8 7 Yet euthanasia is not mere
"killing;" it is "mercy killing." What makes euthanasia merciful?
Let us think again of the terminally ill husband who asks his
wife to take out his hidden pistol and shoot him to put him out of
his misery. 8 If the wife does what her husband asks, she must understand the act of killing her husband, quite counterintuitively, as
the less harmful of the two options confronting her-killing her
husband or letting him live. The only way that she can arrive at
87 In Murphy's terms, killing is the harshest way that our "system of rules" might

allow one person to treat another.
88 See supra text accompanying note 81. Of the two couples mentioned earlier, I
am here referring to the one in which the wife shoots the husband out of compassion,
not out ofjealousy over the husband's past affairs.
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this paradoxical understanding of the act of killing is by seeing the
result of the act from her husband's perspective. She must abandon
her own instinctive preference that her beloved remain alive, and
attempt to feel her husband's suffering as he is experiencing it.
This tells us that we call euthanasia "mercy" killing because it entails the shifting of perspectives, from that of the person who must
act, to that of the person who will bear the brunt of the action.
Mercy here, just as in the context of criminal sentencing, can flourish only when an actor deliberately turns the tables and imagines
himself receiving, rather than dispensing, action.
7.

Mercy springs from an effort to see not just the impact
of the sentence, but also the crime itself, from the
defendant's perspective.

What I have described in the preceding section is the core of
mercy. For when we think of a merciful sentence, the most common image is of a sentence that takes account of some special frailness in a defendant or some set of special circumstances in a
defendant's life that makes an otherwise acceptable punishment
seem excessively harsh. We might ask, however, whether there is
anything to mercy beyond the effort to see the impact of the sentence from the defendant's perspective. Might mercy also include
an imaginative effort to see the crime itself from the defendant's
perspective?
In order to answer this question, we must remind ourselves of
the reasons why a retributivist sentencer might wish to envision the
crime from the defendant's perspective before selecting a sentence
from within the legislatively approved range of possible sentences.
The primary retributive goal is to impose a sentence that measures
up to the criminal's just deserts-that is, a sentence that captures
the full extent of the criminal's particular affront to his victims and
to society. The sentence will do this in one of two ways: either it
will take the crime as a false statement about the defendant's
worth, and seek to correct it, or it will take the crime as an unfair
casting off of the burden of obeying the law, and seek to replace it.
We would therefore expect a retributive system of punishment to
insist on a very full and rich description of the wrongfulness of the
criminal's conduct, so that its punishments come as close as possible to capturing the criminal's just deserts. One way for a sentencer to enhance the fullness and the richness of that description
would be for him to attempt to envision the crime itself-that is,
the false statement of worth or the unfair act of freeriding-from
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the defendant's perspective. The inquiry would focus on what
statement the criminal himself thought he was making about his
relative worth, or on how significant an abdication from the duty of
obeying the law the criminal intended to allow himself.
As an initial matter, it should come as no surprise that Jeffrie
Murphy would not define any attempt to see the crime itself from
the defendant's perspective as mercy. Instead, Murphy would see
this imaginative effort as one step in the overall process of individuation, which is itself an attribute of the virtue of justice. Murphy,
we will recall, identifies as "basic demands of justice" that "like
cases be treated alike, that morally relevant differences between
persons be noticed, and that our treatment of those persons be
affected by those differences. "89 Thus, mercy-defined as the reduction of a sentence to account for individual differences in a
defendant's criminal thought and behavior-is simply redundant
of that aspect of justice that requires individuation of sentences.
To label any portion of the process of individuation as mercy
strikes Murphy as "dangerous," because it suggests that individuation is something to which defendants have no right, something
that is "somehow optional as a free gift or act of grace."90
Notwithstanding its apparent logic, we should not accept too
quickly this dismissal of mercy as a moral redundancy. For Murphy
seems to succeed in his effort at dismissing mercy only by resorting
to a thoroughly flimsy and impoverished notion of individuation.
Let us recall for a moment how he goes about proving that mercy is
a redundancy of individuation. He examines the cases of DI and
D 2 , two individuals charged with killings, where D, killed his beloved child in an automobile accident and D2 killed an enemy in
cold blood. Murphy accepts the idea that the case of D1 presents a
situation where "[i] t is proper for the judge to go easy," and suggests that "such easing up would be called by many people an act of
mercy."9 This last idea is the offensive one for Murphy: he sees
no point in defining DI's case as one calling for mercy, because
there are obvious moral differences between his case and D2 's that
make it simply just (as opposed to merciful) to impose a lighter
sentence on D1. "[W]hy talk of mercy here," he asks rhetorically,
"and confuse what we are doing with some moral virtue that re92
quires the tempering of justice?"
89 MURPHY & HAMPTON,

90 Id. at 172 (Murphy).
91 Id. at 170 (Murphy).
92 Id. at 171 (Murphy).

supra note 7, at 171 (Murphy).
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At least the first half of Murphy's question is apt: why talk of
mercy here at all? The cases of D, and D2 present no opportunity
for the exercise of mercy, even under Murphy's own definition. As we

know, Murphy sees mercy as the act of imposing a lighter sentence
than the governing system of rules permits. If a pair of cases is to
reveal anything important about mercy, then, the "system of rules"
must permit the same sentence in both cases. This is the point of
using a dyad of cases like DI's and D2 's as an instructive device in
the first place: the same sentence is theoretically possible in both,
and we learn something about mercy by understanding how the
crucial distinctions between the two cases require different sentencing decisions. But do we really think that any civilized system
of rules would approve of the same sentence for D1 and D2 ? It
would be an odd system of rules indeed that endorsed a sentencer's decision to impose the same sentence on a person who
plans and carries out an execution-style murder of a hated enemy
and a person who runs over his own child while backing down the
driveway.
Thus, when Murphy points out that D, is entitled to a shorter
sentence than D2, and suggests that "such easing up would be
called by many people an act of mercy,""3 he is simply setting up a
straw man that he can take relish in knocking down. He appears to
succeed in dismissing mercy as a redundancy of individuation only
because he falsely posits mercy as detecting ridiculously broad and
self-evident distinctions in culpability. But if hypothetical cases are
going to help us understand something important about the nature of mercy, they cannot compare Jack the Ripper to a careless
driver. Gross distinctions like these present no opportunity for
mercy even to come into play. Mercy is instead a subtler virtue,
assisting a sentencer in distinguishing between, say, a person who
sells a friend marijuana for a party and a person who sells a friend
marijuana for medicinal use. A dyad of cases like this one illuminates the concept of mercy because it gives us a glimpse into the
process by which a sentencer undertakes the delicate enterprise of
probing for morally relevant differences between defendants
whose culpability is sufficiently similar that they might not unjustly
receive sentences chosen from identical or substantially overlapping sentencing ranges.
We are now in a position to see why Murphy would reject the
notion that mercy includes the effort to see the crime from the
defendant's perspective. Seeing the crime from the defendant's
93 Id. at 170 (Murphy).
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perspective is, to Murphy, just another way of detecting distinguishing aspects of a particular case. As such, it is an aspect of justice
rather than of mercy, since a prime concern of justice is to calibrate sentences on the basis of the "morally relevant differences
between persons."94 But this argument presupposes uniform
agreement about what constitute "morally relevant differences" between offenders-the kind of uniform agreement that we can only
expect when comparing such patently disparate killers as D, and
D2. In other words, Murphy's argument mistakenly assumes that all
morally salient aspects of a crime will always leap out at a retributivist sentencer who is viewing the offense not from the perspective
of the defendant or of any other party to the criminal episode, but
from his position of supposed perspectival detachment.
This is where Murphy's dismissal of mercy as a redundancy of
individuated justice is too glib. Contrary to Murphy's claim, all of
the moral differences between crimes and criminals are not always
obvious to a retributivist sentencer who is viewing the case from a
position of detachment. The problem is not that retributivist
sentencers lack the innate capacity or sensitivity to detect moral
differences. Rather, the problem is that the position of detachment that retributivists claim to occupy is not as detached as they
believe.
As explained above, retributivism celebrates justice as the primary goal of criminal sentencing. In our legal tradition, we associate justice with norms of neutrality, even-handedness, and lack of
bias. We think of justice as blind: we expect that our judges will
disengage themselves from the advocate's role and from the perspectives of the parties before them in order to pronounce a neutral, and therefore just, judgment. Thus, in our tradition, we
associate retribution with justice and justice with neutrality. The
syllogism virtually completes itself: retribution is neutrality. We
understand a retributivist sentencer to be a judge who views the
criminal event and the individuating claims of the parties to it from
a position of neutral detachment.
This syllogism is faulty for two reasons, one theoretical and
one practical. The first of these is that retributive theory is more at
war than at one with neutrality and detachment. The impetus to
punish under a retributive model comes from the wrong practiced
by the offender upon his victim-a wrong that creates a moral debt
running from offender to victim. The purpose of retributive punishment is to force repayment by the offender of the debt his of94 Id. at 171 (Murphy).
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fense created. Thus, retributive punishment is punishment on
behalf of victims (just as utilitarian punishment is punishment on
behalf of society). Punishment that is openly imposed on behalf of
one of the parties to the criminal episode must, at the very least, be
in tension with values of strict neutrality.
As a theoretical matter, then, the retributive process is set in
motion with the perspective of the victim in a position of privilege.
In other words, retribution masquerades as neutral and without a
perspective when in fact it prefers the perspective of the victim.
Retributive theory thus provides a powerful illustration of Martha
Minow's insight that there is no such thing as a truly objective and
detached vantage point for assessing claims of individuation-that
is, claims of difference between people or things. Any person who
scrutinizes something for its salient features must inevitably work
from a value-laden premise about what is salient and what is not, or
about what constitutes "salience."9 5 In assessing an offender's
claim to individuation, then, the value-laden perception from
which the retributivist sentencer actually works is the victim's, not
the offender's.
This indulgence of the victim's view, engendered by theory, is
enhanced in practice. More than at any time in our nation's history, we are now a nation of victims. Statistics show that in one
recent year alone, crime touched nearly one in ten individuals age
twelve and older, and well over one in ten American households.9 6
Judges are members of this society of victims: they and their families and friends are not exempt from rampant car theft, burglary,
assault, and drug crime. More importantly, in many jurisdictions,
judges are elected to their positions as criminal sentencers by voters who perceive their communities to be under siege by criminals
and who believe that the judicial process does little but coddle
those offenders. In this climate of victimization, it is easy indeed to
see how the subtle victim alignment of retributive theory can turn
to a full, albeit unarticulated, preference for the perspective of the
victim and hostility to the perspective of the defendant.
This, then, is the position of "neutrality" and "detachment"
that greets a criminal defendant's claim of individuation at sentencing. It is a "neutrality" strained by a strong theoretical and
95

See

MARTHtA MINOW, MAKING ALL THE DIFFERENCE: INCLUSION, EXCLUSION, AND

AMERICAN LAw 49-78 (1990); see also Benjamin Zipursky, Note, Deshaney and theJuris-

prudence of Compassion, 65 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1101, 1128-47 (1990).
96 See BUREAU OFJUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OFJUSTICE, SOURCEBOOK OF
CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATIsTIcs-1990 251 (Kathleen Maguire and Timothy J. Flanagan
eds., 1991).
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practical tug toward the perspective of the victim and away from
the defendant's view. It is a "detachment" that has quietly attached
itself to an attitude hostile toward a defendant's claim of individuation. Thus it will not do to suggest, as Murphy does, that detached
and neutral retributive justice, standing alone and unaided by
mercy's glimpse into the viewpoint of the offender, will truly detect
all relevant moral aspects of an offense. Rather, in certain circumstances, the only way for a sentencer to be sure that he has wrung
from the case before him all of its distinguishing features is to force
himself to attempt to see the crime itself from the defendant's
perspective.
An example will prove this point. Two real estate developers,
R1 and R2 , have their own construction businesses in the town of
Jonesville. Each applies separately to Jonesville's zoning board for
a variance, but the board turns each of them down. However, the
chairman of the zoning board tells each developer confidentially
that things have changed inJonesville since the recent election of a
new mayor. The chairman offers his opinion to each of the developers that it would be wise to take the matter up with the mayor.
R, and R2 arrange meetings with the mayor, and the mayor tells
each of them exactly the same thing: there will be no more zoning
variances, and no more construction, in Jonesville without a
$100,000 cash payment directly to him. R1 and R2 both succumb to
the mayor's corrupt demands. Each of them raises the money and
hands the mayor a suitcase containing $100,000. The mayor's
scheme is eventually revealed, and R, and R2 are indicted. Each of
the developers eventually pleads guilty to the same crime.
R1 and R2 come before the judge for sentencing. The judge
reviews the details of their crimes, and also learns the following
information about the defendants themselves. R, is a forty-fiveyear-old man who immigrated to the United States at the age of
thirty from a country that was ruled by a dictatorship. In that country, corruption among local government officials was rampant, and
the police were notoriously lax in their enforcement of the laws
against graft. In fact, the police were often in league with local
officials, and sought to protect them whenever possible. R2 is also a
forty-five-year-old man. He was born and raised in Jonesville. Because their crimes are identical, R1 and R2 have identical sentencing guideline ranges of ten to sixteen months in jail.
The judge sentences R2 to a fourteen-month term of imprisonment. Counsel for R1 then rises to argue for a lighter sentence for
his client. He emphasizes that R, grew up in a very different polit-
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ical system from ours, where local government officials openly and
routinely solicited bribes, and where those who attempted to report them were likelier to be punished than the corrupt officials.
The sentencing judge might react to this argument in two
ways. On the one hand, he might impose the same sentence on R,
as he imposed on R2 , accompanying the sentence with the explanation that R1, whatever his upbringing, was now an American citizen,
and that if he had wished to reap the benefits of this new country's
economic opportunities, he should also have learned to play by its
rules. Such a sentence would certainly be well within the scope of
the judge's discretion.97 Indeed, many would view such a reaction
to Rl's plea for mitigation as entirely justified. Even those who disagreed with his reaction would be hard pressed to label the sentence itself as affirmatively "unjust."
On the other hand, however, the sentencing judge might attempt to imagine the instincts of a person raised in RI's country of
origin when confronted with a corrupt solicitation by a local government official. In other words, he might make a good-faith effort to see the mayor's corrupt offer as it appeared not to some
abstract developer, but to R1 himself, based on RI's decades of experience in a very different political and social system. Seeing the
crime from Rl's perspective, the judge would certainly not be justified in determining that RI's behavior was not criminal. He would,
however, not abuse his discretion by concluding that RI's culpability differed from R2 's, and by allowing that conclusion to have an
impact on where, within the authorized sentencing range, R1 's sentence should fall.
This latter approach to RI's sentence is one that I would describe as merciful, because it springs from an imaginative effort to
see the crime not just from the perspective of the victims and society, but from the perspective of the defendant. R, is likely to have
had a different reaction to the mayor's offer from the one we
would expect of a person born and raised in this country. However, the likelihood that a retributivist sentencer will overidentify
with the perspective of the one who has been wronged dulls the
sentencer to the unusual claim of individuation and predisposes
him to approach the claim dismissively rather than respectfully.
Mercy here enhances complete individuation by reminding the
judge of his duty to indulge all perspectives in his deliberative process by considering them all with comparable respect.
97 Indeed, under the federal sentencing guidelines, the court of appeals would
have no jurisdiction even to review Rl's sentence. See supra note 67.
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Significantly, Murphy's unrealistic view of the nature of criminal sentencing leaves him utterly unable to account for the possibility of a difference in treatment of R, and R2 . For Murphy, we
will recall, mercy is a downward deviation from a sentence that is
independently ascertainable as the just one. It is, in effect, an appendage to the core judicial function of imposing a sentence that
is "just." This formulation is meaningless in the context of the task
of devising sentences for R1 and R2. The judge who must sentence
R1 and R2 , and who must figure out what to do with RI's claim
about the significance of his foreign background, does not have
the luxury of beginning his deliberations with a specific sentence
that he knows to be the "just" one. Indeed, that is precisely his
task-to figure out what might be just sentences for R, and R2 .
Mercy, defined here as the effort to see the crime from the defendant's perspective, is not an afterthought to the judge's decisionmaking process, but an integral part of it.
The example of the two real estate developers thus shows two
of mercy's important features. First, it proves the irrelevance of
Murphy's account of mercy and justice to the real sentencing decisions that judges are called upon to make every day. Where ajust
sentence might be any one of a range of permissible dispositions,
mercy does not tamper with the results of the judge's work. It is
the judge's work. This is because a sentencing judge's task in settling upon ajust sentence from within an authorized range is a sort
of mental journey through the perspectives of all of the parties to
the criminal episode. The judge visits the perspectives of all of
those individuals, attempting to fashion for himself a concurrence
of all of their views about the sentencing task. Mercy is not an afterthought to this journey, or an optional side trip. It is an essential stopping-off point that the sentencer cannot miss if his journey
is to be complete.
Second, the example shows that there is more to mercy than
the effort to see just the impact of the sentence on the defendant
from the defendant's perspective. Mercy also includes an effort to
see the crime itself from the defendant's perspective. Indeed, with
this final example, we are able to formulate a complete definition
of the role of mercy in the real sentencing decisions that judges are
called upon to make. In a sentencer's process of selecting a sentence from within a range of authorized punishments, mercy is a
frame of mind induced by the imaginative effort to see both the
impact of the possible sentences and the nature of the criminal
conduct from the defendant's perspective.
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ROLE OF MERCY IN THE PROCESS OF
CRIMINAL SENTENCING

Now that we have a full and complete definition of mercy, we

might be tempted to jump to a quick conclusion about mercy's
moral status. It certainly looks like a very nice thing-a kind way
for judges to treat defendants who come before them. But if mercy
is a true moral virtue, we have to be able to say something more
precise about it than that it is a variety of kindness. Kindness is an
attitude that a person can adopt or decline to adopt as he wishes;
no one is obliged to be kind. A moral virtue, on the other hand, is a

quality or trait that a person must bring to bear upon a particular
activity or practice, if the person is to perform that activity or practice well.98 It is, in other words, a quality or trait that moves a person along toward the goal of virtuous action in some crucial way.'
Thus, we can only know the moral status of mercy if we first know
what it does for a sentencer. What, then, is mercy's role in the task
of criminal sentencing? Does it move the sentencer along toward
the goal of sentencing well-that is, imposing thoroughly and
richly just'00 sentences?
A judge sentences well when he devises sentences that best
serve the values that underlie our process of criminal justice. That
process is our society's primary response to a criminal episode.
There are, of course, many ways to think of the criminal episode.
Of these, one of the most common and most powerful is to see a
crime as an event that works a fundamental change in the relationship between the criminal and his victim. In committing a crime,
the criminal changes his relationship with his victim in one of two
ways. He might seize upon a preexisting condition of relative weakness, powerlessness, or other disadvantage in his victim, and then
singlemindedly pursue his own desires and goals without regard
for the desires, goals, and rights of the victim. Offenses involving
98 MAclrrvE, supra note 53, at 178.

99 See id. at 140 ("The immediate outcome of the exercise of a virtue is a choice
which issues in right action"); see also id. at 174-78.
100 As Alasdair Maclntyre suggests in After Virtue, the inquiry into whether a quality
or trait is a moral virtue is inevitably somewhat question-begging. Virtues, after all,
can only be understood in the context or the particular moral framework or worldview that produces them. See generally id. at 169-74 (because of their different moral
frameworks, very different lists of the moral virtues would come from Homer, Aristotle, the authors of the New Testament, Jane Austen, and Benjamin Franklin); see also
infra notes 111-112 and accompanying text. The point of this Article is to demonstrate that mercy is a moral virtue in a retributivist theory of criminal justice. The
Article therefore assumes that it is the retributive concern for just deserts that defines
and bounds the moral discussion.
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fraud or breach of a relationship of trust are good examples of this
type of criminal act. On the other hand, the criminal might find
no preexisting condition of relative powerlessness in his victim, but
nonetheless decide to create one through, for example, superior
physical strength or use of a weapon. This variety of criminal episode includes such offenses as assault or armed robbery.
Both of these sorts of criminal events work changes in the relationship between the criminal and his victim because they represent statements by the criminal about his worth relative to his
victim's. The criminal is announcing, in effect, that he occupies a
position of greater moral significance than his victim, and that his
elevated position entitles him to knock around his victim, a moral
inferior. Jeffrie Murphy summarizes this viewpoint nicely when he
notes that "[o]ne reason we so deeply resent moral injuries done to
us is not simply that they hurt us in some tangible or sensible way;
it is because such injuries are also messages-symbolic communications. They are ways a wrongdoer has of saying to us, 'I count but
you do not,' 'I can use you for my purposes,' or 'I am here up high
and you are there down below.' "101 To a retributivist, of course,
such statements are false, because they violate the egalitarian premise of the Kantian theory of equal human worth.
If a criminal episode is a false statement by a wrongdoer about
his worth relative to his victim's, then the process of criminal justice can be seen as society's rejoinder to the wrongdoer's false
statement. Of course, before correcting a person's statement
about his worth relative to another's, society must first examine
that statement closely to make sure that it is in fact false. That
examination, I would suggest, is the criminal trial. A trial is a recounting of the story of the alleged criminal episode, so that an
arbiter (a judge or a jury) can determine the truth or falsity of the
accused's statement of his relative moral worth and significance.'1 2
The arbiter might decide that the story of the alleged criminal episode does not present a seriously inaccurate statement of the accused's worth relative to his victim's, and acquit the defendant. On
the other hand, the arbiter might see the story of the criminal episode as containing a false statement by the accused about his worth
relative to his victim's. In such an event, the arbiter would convict
101 MURPHY & HAMprON, supra note 7, at 25 (Murphy). A vivid illustration of this
message is the remark by the tax-evading hotel queen Leona Helmsley that "only the
little people pay taxes." See Maid Testifies Helmsley DeniedPaying Taxes, N.Y. TiMFS, July
12, 1989, at B2.
102 See, e.g., Robert A. Burt, Injustice Remembered and Resolved, Avenged and
Avoided 6-7 (unpublished manuscript on file with the author).
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the defendant, thereby announcing that the parties to the criminal
episode stand in an imbalanced relationship by virtue of the criminal's wrongful assertion of greater worth.
The criminal sentence is society's mechanism for restoring
these imbalanced relationships to a posture of equilibrium. It
achieves this restorative goal by dramatizing or playing out a corrective adjustment to a criminal's false statement about the comparative worth and significance of the parties to the criminal
episode. In other words, the criminal sentence returns the pointer
on the scales to zero by visiting upon the criminal a version of what
the criminal visited upon his victim. There is an undeniable sense
ofjustice and desert to this model of the criminal sentence. It is an
application of what Kant called the "principle of equality," which is
the principle of not treating one side more favorably than the
other. Accordingly, any undeserved evil that you inflict on
someone else among the people is one that you do to yourself.
If you vilify him, you vilify yourself; if you steal from him, you
steal from yourself; if you kill him, you kill yourself.'
This view of the criminal sentence also satisfies those retributivists who
understand a crime as the wrongful casting off of the burden to obey
the law. Under this approach, returning the parties to a position of
equilibrium "is the way to most nearly replace the missing burden
where it properly belonged."10 4
It is important to note that the model of the criminal sentence
that I am developing is not the potentially brutal (and more authentically Kantian)'1 5 doctrine of jus talionis,which takes an eye for an eye
and a tooth for a tooth. Rather, the criminal sentence restores the
parties to a posture of equilibrium by visiting on the criminal only a
version of what he did to his victim. The version of the crime that the
criminal sentence seeks to impose is the version that best captures the
criminality of the wrongdoer's conduct. As we saw earlier, one model
of the criminal episode represents a crime as a false statement by the
wrongdoer about his worth and significance relative to his victim's.
The wrongdoer makes that false statement in a specific way: he creates or seizes upon a position of relative powerlessness in the victim,
and then singlemindedly pursues his own agenda through the victim
without regard for the victim's rights and desires. This is the crucial
103 KANT, supra note 19, at 332.
104 Richard Wasserstrom, CapitalPunishment as Punishmen, in 7 MIDWEST STUDIES IN
PHILOSOPHY 473, 496 (Peter A. French et al. eds., 1982); see also MuR'HY & COLEMAN,
supra note 11, at 130.
105 See KArr, supra note 19, at 332 ("Only the Law of retribution (jus talionis) can
determine exactly the kind and degree of punishment").
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aspect of the criminal's wrong that the criminal sentence seeks to capture. Just as the criminal made his false statement by exploiting his
victim's powerlessness, the criminal sentence corrects that statement
by placing the criminal in a position of submission. In other words,
the criminal sentence corrects the criminal's false worth statement by
recreating and visiting upon the defendant a version of the powerlessness that the criminal selfishly created or exploited in his victim.
A fairly obvious, and quite natural, way of implementing this objective would be to let the victim dictate the sentence. After all, who is
in a better position to appreciate the full extent of the criminal's exploitation of the victim than the victim himself? A system of victim
sentencing would certainly have an undeniable sense of rough justice
to it. First the criminal found or made his victim weak and had his
way with him; now society weakens the criminal and gives the victim
license to have his way with the criminal. For the exploited and
demeaned victim, turnabout would certainly be fair play.
But here we must notice a crucial choice that we have made in
structuring our criminal justice system: we do not permit victims to
sentence those who have wronged them. That is, we have a system of
public, not private, enforcement of the criminal laws, in which
sentences are devised by judges rather than by victims. This might
seem to us a prosaic detail, because public prosecution is so thoroughly a part of our legal culture. Yet we may still ask ourselves why
we have made the decision not to allow victims to devise criminal
sentences.
We do not allow victims to sentence criminals because we lack
confidence that the victims would be "fair" to their malefactors. But
this idea needs some unpacking. In what sense do we fear that victims
would be unfair? We fear they would be unable to see beyond the
simple hatred for their oppressors that they naturally feel after being
selfishly exploited, and unable to free themselves up from a quite understandable-and potentially dangerous-instinct for revenge. In
other words, we have no confidence that, given the opportunity to
devise a sentence for his malefactor, a victim would refrain from simply repeating the crime by exploiting the criminal's powerlessness in
the same way that the criminal did, without regardfor the welfare or perspective of the criminaL Jeffrie Murphy voices this concern succinctly:
victims, he notes, "have a natural tendency to make hasty judgments
of responsibility, magnify the wrong done to them, and thus seek retribution out of all just proportion to what is actually appropriate." °6
Thus, when called upon to punish, victims "sometimes get such mat106 MulPHi

&

HAMPTON,

supra note 7, at 100 (Murphy).
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ters exactly right; but, more typically, they get them wrong-more and
the more wildly angry and filled with hatred they
more wrong
10 7
become."
Yet we should dwell a moment longer on our reasons for rejecting a system of victim sentencing in criminal cases. Crimes are but
one variety of human activity that entails physical and emotional pain
to victims. In most situations where one person harms another, society expects the victim to resort to a version of self-help, either through
private systems of redress and remediation, or through privately sponsored civil lawsuits. Our reasons for preferring public to private sentencing had therefore better be compelling, because depriving victims
of the opportunity to punish their oppressors is a significant restriction on the freedom of victims to act to help themselves and vindicate
their slandered worth.
When we say that we lack confidence that a victim would be a fair
sentencer because he would be too likely to succumb to the urge for
revenge, we mean several things. First, as Murphy suggests, we lack
complete confidence in the truthfulness of the victim's report of the
harm that the criminal's act caused him. Still stinging from the shame
that accompanies the experience of being exploited and demeaned,
the victim will likely magnify the pain and hurt of the episode. Second, we are suspicious of the victim's ability to perceive accurately the
nature of the wrong done to him and the extent of the criminal's
responsibility for it. We suspect that the victim will exaggerate the
wrongfulness of the conduct and understand the act to have been singlemindedly purposeful and malicious. Third, we have no reason to
believe that the victim will be inclined to express an appropriate level
of concern for the welfare of the wrongdoer. Because of the hurt and
indignity that the victim has suffered, he will be excessively driven to
see to it that the criminal taste a good measure of suffering as well.
These, then, are the values that prompt us to adopt a system of
public, rather than private, sentencing: (1) a desire to describe in a
balanced way the harm that the victim has suffered; (2) a desire to
describe even-handedly the nature and extent of the criminal's false
statement about his worth and significance relative to his victim's; and
(3) a desire to impose a sentence that does not run roughshod over
the criminal, but instead takes into account his welfare. These must
be very significant values to us, because they are our justifications for
stripping victims of their right to self-help.108
107

Id.

108 More precisely, they are our retibutivejustifications for stripping victims of their

right to self-help. There are other valid justifications that do not involve retributive
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The second and third of these significant values should look familiar to us, because they are the values fostered by the frame of mind
that I have identified as mercy. Mercy, as I explained in Part II of this
Article, is an attitude that the sentencer adopts, during the process of
selecting a sentence from within a range of authorized punishments,
by imagining both the nature of the criminal episode and the impact
of the possible sentences from the defendant's perspective. Mercy reminds the judge of how things look from the defense table. Mercy's
role in the sentencing process is therefore a limiting or restraining
one; it provides a check against the risk that the sentencer will get
things wrong by describing the nature of the crime in an imbalanced
way or underestimating the impact of the sentence on the defendant.
Why, though, do we have reason to fear that judges will get this
wrong in the first place? We may mistrust victims as sentencers, but
judges are not victims. They are individuals whom society selects and
compensates for their impartiality. Of what use could a limiting value
like mercy possibly be to a judge, whose institutional goal is supposed
to be balance in the first place?
The answer to this question is that true balance-never an easily
reached goal-is an especially difficult objective for a judge to attain
when his task is to sentence a criminal. wrongdoer. The task of sentencing is to devise a punishment that blends utilitarian and retributive concerns. This task involves deterring the criminal and others
from lawlessness in the future, incapacitating him for a period of time
to protect his victim and society from a recurrence of his lawlessness,
and exacting just recompense from him for the way in which he
demeaned his victim. There is, quite naturally, a strong undercurrent
of concern for the victim in this enterprise. The act of punishing
grants the victim a period of respite from fear of his malefactor, and it
also elevates and reinstates the victim to his true position of equal
worth.
With this sort of agenda, it is easy to see how a judge might come
to associate or align himself in some basic way with the victim, whose
interests he is called upon to vindicate." ° ' Indeed, this alignment
concerns. For example, by adopting a system of public rather than private sentencing, we distance the victim from the act of punishing as well as the responsibility for
that act. This choice surely diminishes the risk that the offender and the victim will
become locked in vendetta, and helps society break cycles of violence that might
otherwise spin on uncontrollably.
109 Freeing the judge up for this alignment is the fact that a judge need be far less
vigilant in protecting the defendant's rights at sentencing than at trial. Many of the
core defense protections at trial-proof beyond a reasonable doubt, strict compliance
with the rules of evidence, exclusion of all but the most reliable of hearsay statements-do not obtain at sentencing proceedings. See, e.g., United States v. Kikumura,
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might tempt him to use sentencing as an opportunity to speak out in
the voice of the wronged victim-the only party to the criminal episode who is formally unrepresented, and has no mandatory, official
voice1 1 ° in the criminal trial."1 This temptation is a particularly
strong one because a criminal case arrives before a judge for sentencing with the parties to the criminal episode in well-defined positions
of inequality. From the preceding stage of the process, the guilt
phase, emerged the conclusion that the defendant made a false statement about his worth relative to the victim's. The sentencer's responsibility is to right that statement. Thus we see the risk that the
sentencer will be tempted to make not simply a correct and balanced
statement of the relative worth of the parties, but a reactive counterstatement of worth valuation on the victim's behalf. The more he aligns
himself with the victim, the greater the urge to malign the victim's
oppressor.
Mercy recognizes this impetus in the structure of the sentencing
process that propels a sentencer toward alignment with the victim,
and guarantees that his sentence will not ultimately fall prey to the
vices that we associate with victim sentencing. In other words, mercy's
role in the sentencing process is to buttress the limiting values that are
our reasons for rejecting a regime in which victims devise the punishment for their malefactors. It is a check against the risk of a quite
natural, but possibly quite destructive, over-identification between the
sentencer and the victim.
We now have a full appreciation notjust of what mercy is, but also
of what it does. Mercy, the defendant-based frame of mind that I described in the second section of this Article, is a distinct but integral
moment in the mental process by which a sentencer selects a punishment from within a societally sanctioned range. It is a moment in the
process that guarantees that the punishment ultimately selected will
be consistent with all of the values of sentencing. These values, as we
have seen, include not just concerns for the rights and perspective of
the victim and of society, but also concerns for the perspective and the
well-being of the criminal. We might see the judge's mental process
918 F.2d 1084, 1099-1104 (3d Cir. 1990). This is because a convicted criminal has a
lesser claim to liberty than a presumptively innocent defendant, and is therefore
"due" less "process." See id. at 1100.
110 Victims do, of course, frequently testify at criminal trials. But there is certainly
no requirement that they do so.
111 The defendant, of course, has a constitutionally guaranteed right to representation, and so does society, in the person of the prosecutor. While the interests of the
victim and society are essentially aligned, the prosecutor is, at bottom, society's representative rather than the victim's.
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for selecting a punishment from within an authorized range as the
slow swing of a pendulum back and forth from one perspective to
another, until finally coming to rest at a particular point in space. In
this analogy, mercy is a force applied to the pendulum that ensures a
full swing through as broad an arc as possible.
Perhaps the most attractive attribute of our new definition of
mercy is that it entirely avoids the problem that plagued Murphy's
attempt to define mercy as an action. We saw earlier that there is
considerable peril in defining mercy as a discount in a sentence, because simple action, standing alone and unconnected to any motive, is
morally inscrutable. Portia's request for an act of mercy by Shylock
seemed a morally worthy plea, but we have good reason to suspect
that it was not. Similarly, in our euthanasia example, the wife's decision to accede to her ailing husband's request that she put him out of
his misery seemed a morally defensible act until we learned her reasons for acceding. Thus, we saw that mercy, defined as an action, too
easily blends with its opposite.
When we see mercy instead as a deliberately induced mental state
that is located in the decision-making process itself, this problem
drops away. For the cleansing presence of mercy in the deliberativeprocess itself guarantees that the act of selecting a punishment will never
be a rancorous act prompted by ill will toward the criminal, but a fully
just act that springs from good will toward the criminal. 1 2 Mercy is
therefore an attribute of the process of criminal sentencing that in112 This is certainly not a new understanding of mercy. In fact, it is a view of mercy
with quite an ancient pedigree, dating back at least to Henry de Bracton's thirteenthcentury treatise On the Laws and Customs of England. In that tract, Bracton defines two
types of mercy: a "mercy of remission," which is like Murphy's definition of mercy in
that it is the simple act of reducing a sentence, and a "mercy of compassion," which is
unrelated to action, and has to do with the attitude that the judge bears toward the
person he is sentencing.
Bracton states at the outset of his discourse on sentencing that there is a preference for the mitigation of sentences: "punishments are rather to be mitigated than
increased." 2 HENRY DE BRACTON, BRACTON ON THE LAWS AND CUSTOMS OF ENGLAND
299 (Samuel E. Thorne ed., Harvard Univ. Press 1968) (n.d.). Yet he cautions that
mercy must not be granted indiscriminately, since "mercy is indeed unjust when it is
extended to the incorrigible." Id. at 306. Bracton seems aware that there is a tension
between these two principles, in that judges are simultaneously to prefer mitigation
yet avoid leniency for those who do not deserve it. He quickly makes clear, however,
that this tension is only apparent, not real: "Let [the sentencer] therefore be merciful
to the unworthy in this way, as always to feel compassion for the man. And let him not
in judgment show mercy to the poor man, that is, the mercy of remission, though to
him there ought to be shown, as to all men, the mercy of compassion." Id.
This is a rather vivid depiction, in a very early source, of the notion of mercy that
I have developed in this Article. It acknowledges the crucial difference between traditional retributivist mercy, the "mercy of remission," which is the act of reducing
sentences, and the "mercy of compassion," which a judge has a duty to show to a/!
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spires confidence in that very process. It enables us to be sure that the
sentencing action that the judge ultimately takes--- an action that is
morally indecipherable on its face-is, in fact, a balanced act ofjustice
rather than a partisan act of malice.
IV.

MERCY AS A MORAL VIRTUE

Now that we know both what mercy is and what it does, we are
finally able to turn to the ultimate question of mercy's status in an
account of the moral virtues. Jeffrie Murphy, as we know, reaches
some rather confident conclusions on this subject. Speaking for
the retributivists, Murphy argues that mercy is one of two things,
neither of which is an independent moral virtue. At best, mercy is
a redundancy of the independent moral virtue ofjustice. At worst,
it is a deviation from that virtue, and therefore a moral vice. These
conclusions, however, apply only to a rather impoverished definition of mercy as an action. Our concern here is to determine the
moral status of mercy, where mercy is more richly defined as a
mental state that arises from a sentencer's imaginative effort to see
the crime and the impact of the sentence from the defendant's
perspective.
First, we must be clear about the terms of the debate. The
question we must answer is whether mercy is a virtue not in the
abstract, or in one's dealings with one's family and friends, but in a
judge's work as a designer of criminal sentences. Virtues have no
moral content in the abstract; they acquire their coherence and
meaning only by their unique capacity to assist a person to achieve
3
excellence in particular varieties of human activity."1
For mercy, the relevant variety of human activity is judgingmore specifically, imposing criminal sentences. Thus, in determining whether mercy is a moral virtue or a moral vice, we must examine the role that it plays in the actual sentencing decisions that
real sentencers are called upon to make. These decisions almost
invariably involve the selection, from within a range of imprisonment terms that are presumptively just, a specific term of days,
months, or years. It can also require a choice of one or more of a
large number of diverse modes of punishment: fines, restitution,
incarceration, community or "halfway house" confinement, proba14
tion, parole or supervised release, and others.
defendants who come before him, and can therefore be seen as an aspect of the
judge's own internal process for devising sentences.
113 See MAcINYRE, supra note 53, at 174-78, 204.
114 See supra note 66.
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Second, we must recognize that we can only expect to answer
the question of whether mercy is a moral virtue by reference to a
particular system of moral values. As Alasdair Maclntyre has perceptively observed, one era's or one culture's virtue might well be
another's vice.115 For example, the drive to acquire goods, a
moral virtue in Benjamin Franklin's world, was for most ancient
Greek philosophers a moral vice; similarly, humility was a vice to
1 16
Aristotle yet a virtue for the authors of the New Testament.
Thus, before drawing any conclusions about mercy's moral status,
we must clearly identify the moral framework that bounds our discussion. As an example, if we were analyzing mercy from a strict
utilitarian perspective, it would surely emerge a vice. A moral virtue to a utilitarian is something that facilitates the realization of the
greatest good for the greatest number. Mercy, as I have defined it
in this Article, is a moment in the sentencer's deliberative process
when the sentencer focusses upon the greatest good for only one
person-the defendant. Thus, to the extent that that moment in
the deliberative process swayed the sentencer in his ultimate
choice of punishment, mercy would lead him away from, not toward, the greatest good for the greatest number. This is the work
of a vice, not a virtue.
But our society's penal system does not occupy a moral space
that is defined exclusively by strict utilitarian values. Rather, our
system is animated by a mix of utilitarian and retributive concerns.
It is a system, to be sure, that seeks to serve such utilitarian goals as
incapacitation and deterrence. It supplements those goals, however, and limits them as well, with retributive concerns for justice
and desert.1 17 We see retributive concerns supplementing utilitarian requirements in a case where, for example, a criminal engages
in some sort of highly unusual, yet deeply destructive, activity, and
incapacitates himself from future criminality in the process.1 18
Since the risk of the crime's recurrence is low, either by the criminal or by others, a strict utilitarian would counsel mild punishment. A retributivist, however, would insist that the punishment be
115
116
117

MAcINma s, supra note 53, at 169-74.

Id. at 171.

See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (1) and (2); see supra note 86.
118 An example of such a crime might be a foiled assassination attempt against the
President by a member of the President's own contingent of Secret Service agents,
during which the attacking agent is himself shot and ultimately left paralyzed. Because Secret Service agents who protect the President are rigorously screened for security risk, this agent's crime is unlikely to be repeated by other agents in the future.
Moreover, because the agent who made the attempt on the President's life is paralyzed, he is unlikely to repeat the attempt in the future.
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severe enough to reflect the inherent harmfulness of the criminal's
conduct. On the other hand, we see retributivism limiting utilitarianism in a case where, for example, a criminal engages in some
sort of tremendously common, yet not particularly harmful, behavior. 119 The utilitarian would seize the opportunity to punish the
criminal severely, if only to send the message to others that they
should desist from committing the same crime. The retributivist,
however, would insist that the punishment bear some sense of proportion to the relatively innocuous nature of the criminal's
wrongdoing.
Because our system of sentencing combines utilitarian and retributive goals, an attribute of the system will be a moral virtue if it
assists a sentencer in attaining one of those goals. In other words, a
sentencing virtue is an attribute that facilitates the selection, from
within a range of permissible punishments, of a sentence that is
maximally consistent with a proper goal, or a mix of proper goals,
of the criminal sentencing process.
There is, however, a significant aspect of the sentencing process that this formulation of moral virtue does not capture. While
a judge may devote considerable care and reflection to the sentence he chooses, his deliberative process is not on view to the
world. 120 Indeed, the judge's deliberative process may not even be
on view to the judge himself; he may allow his "gut" to tell him
what the right thing to do is in particular cases. What is on view to
the world is the action that the judge ultimately takes at the end of
his deliberative process. And we now know, from our examination
of Portia's speech in The Merchant of Venice and other examples,
that great danger lurks in a model of sentencing virtue that examines only actions. Such a model hinders us from seeing the underlying motivation for a sentencer's decision to take, or to refrain
from taking, any particular action in sentencing. It enshrouds,
rather than penetrates, the deliberative process and the sentence it
produces.
If a formulation of moral virtue in the criminal sentencing
119 A petty theft offense such as shoplifting items of little value might be such a
crime.
120 In fact, in circumstances where ajudge selects a sentence from within a guideline range of two years or less, he need give no explanation or justification whatsoever
for his action. See United States v. Richardson, 925 F.2d 112, 117 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 2868 (1991); United States v. Duque, 883 F.2d 43, 45 (6th Cir. 1989);
United States v. Ehret, 885 F.2d 441, 445 (8th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 879
(1990). Only where ajudge chooses a sentence from an exceedingly broad guideline
range or departs from the range entirely is he required to give any justification for his
action. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(c)(1) & (2) (1988).
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process is to have any real practical value, it must take account of
this feature of the sentencing process. That is, it must assist us in
making moral sense of what is, on its surface, morally ambiguous.
Thus, a moral virtue will be an attribute of criminal sentencing that
permits all of the parties with an interest in the process-the victim, the defendant, society, and the judge himself-to have confidence that the punishment ultimately selected is maximally
consistent with a proper goal, or some mix of proper goals, of our
sentencing regime.
We are now able to see that mercy, as defined in this Article, is
an independent moral virtue of the criminal sentencing process. It
is a moral virtue because it permits all of those involved in the process to be satisfied that the sentence the judge selects is consistent
with an important requirement of retributive punishment-respect
for the autonomy of the defendant. Retributivism, we will recall,
has the goal of meting out punishment that the criminal deserves
or merits as a consequence of his wrongful exploitation of another.
It demands the measure of punishment that is proportional to the
wrongfulness of the criminal's conduct, even if the societal effect
of that punishment is thoroughly disutilitarian. At the foundation
of the retributive enterprise is the Kantian notion that each member of society, in his capacity as a being capable of reason, has the
right to be treated as an end in himself, rather than as a means to
another's ends. This foundational principle provides the retributivist with his reason for punishing: the criminal has created an
imbalance in the social order by treating his victim as a means to
the criminal's ends rather than as an end in himself, and that imbalance must be righted. Yet this foundational principle also limits
the extent to which the retributivist may inflict punishment. The
retributivist may never disregard the right of the criminal to be
treated consistently with his status as a being capable of reason.
Thus, as Jeffrie Murphy himself explains, under a retributive
theory, "[a] punishment will be unjust (and thus banned on principle) if it is of such a nature as to be degrading or dehumanizing
(inconsistent with human dignity).'121 Interestingly, retributivists

give content to this idea through an image of conversation or dialogue with the criminal. Edmund Pincoffs defends the retributivist
approach to punishment on the ground that it, unlike the competing utilitarian model, is a system that we can explain and justify not
121 MURPHY & CoLEMAN,

supra note 11, at 147.
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just to society, but to the criminal himself 122 Murphy, in detailing
how a punishment might degrade a criminal by treating him as an
animal rather than a human being, suggests that punishment must
be a "human way of relating" to the criminal. 123 This requirement
would forbid a punishment if the criminal "could not be expected
to understand [it] while it goes on, have a view about it, enter into
discourse about it, or conduct any other characteristically human
124
activities during the process."
Of course, it makes good sense that retributivists defend their
penal system on the ground that it permits a dialogue about the
sentence between the criminal and his punisher. The potential for
such a dialogue is precisely what differentiates retributivism from
its rival, utilitarianism. Pure utilitarianism calibrates itself by reference to no higher a human function than sentience. A howl of
pain is the only thing a strict utilitarian sentencer is interested in,
or even capable of, hearing from the defendant. Retributivism disdains this approach to punishment, opting instead for a system calibrated by reference to the higher human function of reason. This
higher human function can, of course, manifest itself simply in the
phenomenon of one individual's quiet contemplation. But in
human social life, the function of reason reveals itself most characteristically through the phenomena of dialogue and discourse.
Thus, retributivism is neither designed nor satisfied merely to
extract a plaintive yelp from an individual who has been cut loose
by society for use as a means to another's ends. Rather, it insists on
at least the possibility of reasoned dialogue with an individual who
recognizes that he is still being treated as a member of human society. In other words, retributivism forswears the rupture in the relationship between society and the criminal that flows from treating
him as something less than an end in himself. Retributivism insists
upon punishment that holds out the possibility of dialogue between the criminal and the sentencer, and between the criminal
125
and society.
122 EDMUND PINCOFFS, THE RATIONALE OF LEGAL PUNISHMENT 6-9 (1966); see MURPHY & COLEMAN, supra note 11, at 127.
123 MuRPHY & COLEMAN, supra note 11, at 147.
124 Id.
125 Retributivism should therefore also condemn

punishments that, by their nature,
foreclose the possibility of reasoned conversation between the criminal on the one
hand and the sentencer and society on the other. The death penalty is unquestionably such a conversation-stopper. It ostentatiously mocks the value of reasoned conversation by annihilating one of the conversants and permanently silencing his voice.
Thus, a system of criminal punishment that imposes the death penalty can do so only
at the expense of the virtue of mercy. Lacking the capacity for mercy, the death
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In light of this, we can ask ourselves a fairly simple question: If
we wished to build a feature into a judge's sentencing process that
insured that the sentence complied with this distinguishing principle of respect for the defendant's dignity, what would that attribute
look like? Since the distinguishing principle is based on a model of
dialogue, the attribute should be a form of dialogue. Indeed, it
should be a moment in the judge's deliberative process that required him to imagine what the defendant would have to say about
the sentence. It should entail the judge's asking himself several
important questions: What would be the defendant's perspective
on the wrongfulness of this conduct? What views would he hold
about the various sentencing options that the judge has? This attribute of imagined dialogue would unquestionably be a moral virtue
for a retributivist, because it would permit everyone involved in the
sentencing process-the defendant, the victim, the judge, and society-to rest assured that the sentence is as consistent as possible
with the defendant's innate human dignity.
That attribute of dialogue is what we know to be mercy. For
mercy, as we have seen, is the frame of mind that a sentencer attains by attempting to imagine the impact of the sentence and the
nature of the criminal behavior from the criminal's perspective. It
is the aspect of the sentencing process that converts the otherwise
morally ambiguous act of punishing into a morally correct one.
Turning Murphy's claim on its head, we might even say that the
only truly just sentence is a sentence that is merciful-one that
emerges from a deliberative process in which the sentencer must
focus at least for a time on the defendant's viewpoint and well-being. Mercy is a moral virtue in such a deliberative process because
it grounds the sentence in the bedrock retributive principle of respect for human dignity. It allows us confidence that the judge's
sentence is not an act of malice toward the criminal, but an act of
good will.
V.

CONCLUSION:

MERCY AND THE REMAKING OF RETRIBUTIviSM

We have now seen mercy in several ways. We have seen what it
is, we have seen what it does, and we have seen its moral content.
And we have learned that mercy is neither a redundancy of justice
nor an indefensible deviation from justice. Instead, for a judge
who must confront the task of selecting a sentence from a range of
authorized punishments, mercy is a guarantor ofjustice. Thus, in a
penalty must be inimical to a fully and richly retributive

sentencing.

system of criminal
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criminal justice system like ours, so steeped in Kantian respect for
the innate human dignity of every member of society, mercy is a
moral virtue.
Yet this is a conclusion that sticks in the craw of many a retributivist. To them, it seems excessively concerned with the perspective of the wrongdoer. "Why all the concern for the dignity of
the guilty party to the criminal episode?" they might ask. "Is not
the victim, by virtue of his status as the innocent, owed our primary
ministrations and efforts?" Jeffrie Murphy surely speaks with the
voice of many of today's retributivists when he reports, candidly
and unsurprisingly, that he has "recently come to think that victim
revenge may be a legitimate purpose of state punishment and that
such institutionalized revenge may not, after all, be so easily distinguished from retribution." 2 6
There is thus an undeniable victim alignment to current retributive theory. This alignment, however, blurs the important distinction between retribution and revenge: retribution springs
from a philosophical directive that an egalitarian valuation of
human worth be maintained, and, when breached, restored; revenge springs from an emotional urge to bring low, or even annihilate, a wrongdoer. Yet this victim-aligned retributivism has largely
won the day, pushing the rich defendant-protective possibilities of
retributive theory to the sidelines. How has this happened? Why is
it that the notion of a balanced retributivism now seems so out of
vogue, so easily dismissed as "soft on crime?"
The answer to these questions lies in history, for things were
not always as they are now. Indeed, if we look back to our nation's
founding we can perceive a radically different implementation of
retributivist ideas than the one that now prevails. The document
to which we must look is our Bill of Rights. Those ten amendments
to the Constitution, of course, include the explicit guarantees to all
people of important rights in criminal cases such as the right to be
free from unreasonable searches and seizures, the right to indictment by a grand jury, the right to trial by a petit jury, the right to
counsel, and the right to the many procedural safeguards that inhere in the notion of "due process of law." It is important to remind ourselves of the truly radical nature of the Founders' plan:
they placed in the organic document of the nation they were creating a core of protections not for those victimized by crime, but for
those accused of it. That is, they saw fit to include not just in ordi126 JEFFRIE
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nary legislation but in the nation's founding document a list of
rights which the criminal defendant could hold up as a shield
against the onslaught of those who accused him of wrongdoing.
This choice by the Founders reflects a deep identification in
their society with the criminal defendant. This identification, of
course, was a product of experience. A principal grievance of the
American colonists toward the Crown was its use of the criminal
justice system as an unrestrained and unprincipled tool of repression. The identification with the criminal defendant that was prevalent in the Founders' vision therefore sprang from a very personal
and vivid fear of prosecution, and through it persecution, that each
of the Founders shared. When they looked upon a criminal defendant, they had ample reason to say, "there but for the grace of
God go I," and to enshrine within the Constitution those rights to
which they would cling if prosecuted by the state.
Today's society no longer shares our Founders' deep identification with the criminal defendant. Our primary identification today is rather with the victims of crime. I do not mean to condemn
this modem perspective, for it too is a product of experience. Just
as the Founders saw themselves as a generation of potentially prosecuted defendants, we see ourselves as a generation of potentially
exploited crime victims. It is a sad truth of today's society that if an
individual is not himself a victim of crime, then to find one he
need look no further than his next-door neighbor whose house was
burglarized, or his co-worker whose car was stolen from the company lot, or his nephew who was mugged for money by a drug addict, or his elderly parents who were bilked out of their retirement
nest egg by a rapacious financial adviser. We feel besieged by
crime; we are all victims. Like the Founders, we are moved to say
"there but for the grace of God go I," but we utter these words
when we look upon the victim of a crime, not the accused.
I would suggest that this perspectival shift is at the root of the
victim alignment in current retributivist thinking. We shrink from
espousing empathic identification with criminal defendants because we fear that doing so would be an act of betrayal-betrayal of
the victims of crime, and to the extent that we all see ourselves as
victims, self-betrayal as well.
Retributivists must recognize, however, that they are fending
off this feared act of self-betrayal at the cost of self-deception. For
it is not possible to implement a truly and richly retributive system
of criminal punishment and do so as an advocate for one or another of the parties to a criminal episode. Kantian retributivism
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insists on an egalitarian valuation of the intrinsic worth of all rational human beings, be they victims of crime or defendants. This
does not mean that victims and criminals are entitled to comparable treatment by society. The criminal has done wrong, and so deserves to be punished; the victim has been wronged, and so
deserves to see his intrinsic worth vindicated and affirmed. However, retributivism does demand that a criminal be judged consistently with his status as an intrinsically worthy human being
endowed with the capacity of reason. To the extent that current
retributive theory is reluctant to own up to these defendant-protective implications, it is a stunted and incomplete retributivism.
The more taken we become with the notion that we are all
victims, and the more we align ourselves with those who are
wronged by crime, the more crucial is the virtue of mercy in our
criminal sentencing system. Mercy is what stands between retribution and revenge. It is a check against our easy over-identification
with those most like ourselves-those who have been wronged by
crime. In a balanced system of justice, mercy must surely be a
moral virtue.

